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INTRODUCTION

Consider the so-called "black hole," a seeming void, a mass of apparently

t Copyright 1990 Peter A. Alces.
• Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
679

680

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

nothing. At least on one level. the black hole is the product of theory. an idea
that defies appreciation in our experiential dimensions of time and space. For
purposes of this extended metaphor. however. it is helpful to recognize that the
black hole may be deceptive: what appears to be a void may in fact be the situs
of the most densely packed matter. There could be more in that black hole than
would be apparent to the casual observer. because even light cannot escape the
attraction of the "void. •• More significantly. if theories positing black holes are
viable. the black hole is a point of intense gravitational attraction. perhaps the
greatest conceivable attraction. 1
Efforts to reformulate the bulk sales law may preclude use of bulk sales
avoidance theories promulgated in Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC" or "Code..). leaving a void. But poet-physicists know better: what remains after the dust settles may instead be a black hole. That black hole could
attract more commercial fraud detritus than ever imagined possible under the
current Article 6 regime. 2
This essay surveys the heavens in the wake of the recent American Law
Institute ("ALI")3 and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL..)4 Repeal/Revision alternatives (the "Alternatives") to
the current Article 6 bulk transfer law. 5 and suggests that consequences of the
Alternatives not fully anticipated by the sponsoring organizations may clutter
the commercial law in ways that will frustrate rather than serve the interests of
transactors. Granted. there may be the stuff of "Chicken Little.. here.6
The inquiry proceeds by describing the bulk sale in terms that emphasize its
similarity to fraud principles generally. Then the relationship between the constructive and actual fraud bases of bulk sales liability is considered. Next the
foundations of actual intent to defraud liability in the commercial law are anal. See generally, S. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME, FROM THE BIG BANG TO BLACK
HOLES (1988).
2. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Article 6, Bulk Transfers (1987). All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), unless otherwise indicated, are to the 1987 text. See infra Appendix for the complete text of Article 6.
3. The American Law Institute (ALI), developed in 1921 to prepare restatements of the law,
was one of the bodies contributing to the drafting and promulgation of a revised Article 6. For a
discussion of the ALI and its mission, see generally Goodrich, The Story of the American Law Institute, 1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 283; Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and the First Restatement of the Law, in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE RESTATEMENT IN THE CoURTS 1 (perm. ed.
1945).
4. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), begun in
1892, is composed of unpaid commissioners who are appointed by state governors and who prepare
acts for consideration by state legislatures. See generally Durban, A History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (1965). The NCCUSL was the second body participating in the drafting and promulgation of the revisions to Article
6.
5. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Repealer of Article 6 Bulk Transfers and [Revised] Article 6
Bulk Sales (1989) (Revised U.C.C. Art. 6 (1989)). Approved by the NCCUSL in August, 1988, and
by the ALI in May, 1989, the current text allows states to select one of two alternatives. Alternative
A repeals Article 6; Alternative B revises Article 6. The repealer is the alternative recommended by
the sponsoring organizations. Revised U.C.C. Art. 6, Prefatory Note at 620-21.
6. See J. JACOBS, ENGLISH FAIRY TALES 113 (3d ed. 1967) ("The skys-a-falling").
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lyzed to support conclusions regarding the relationship between constructive
and actual fraud principles. From that perspective, treatment of transferee liability issues as they are resolved under current Article 6 guides the analysis of
the transferee liability issues posited by the Alternatives.
I.

RELATIONSHIP OF BULK TRANSFER LIABILITY TO THE ACTUAL INTENT
TO DEFRAUD

Under Article 6, a bulk sale occurs when a business engaged in the sale of
merchandise from stock7 sells more than fifty-percentS of its inventory out of the
ordinary course of business.9 Currently, Article 6 provides limited protection
for creditors of a bulk transferor by requiring that those creditors receive notice
prior to a bulk transfer of assets. 10 Appraisal of the impact of the proposed
Alternatives on this creditor protection requires an understanding of the fraud
elements that arguably attend the bulk sale.
7. U.C.C. § 6-102(3). See also Nolte v. Winstanley, 16 Ariz. 327, 145 P . 246 (1914) (fixtures,
wagons, teams, and implements of manufacture are personalty, not stock in trade under terms of
bulk sales statute); W.B. Parham & Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co., 127 Ga. 303, 56 S.E. 460
( 1907) (bar fixtures are part of stock of goods within meaning of bulk sales statute); J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE§ 20-2, at 891-900 (3d ed. 1988) (UCC bulk transfer law
applies to transfers not in ordinary course of business, that constitute major part of inventory composed of materials, supplies, merchandise); Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Businesses Included, 1954
WASH. U.L.Q. I (case law application of bulk sales law uniformly covers retail merchants and most
restaurants, bars, and mercantile businesses; repair shops and farmers generally exempt; unclear
whether manufacturers covered). But see Yeager v. Powell, 219 Ark. 713, 244 S.W.2d 141 (1951)
(mortgage of repair shop's entire parts stock within bulk mortgage statute); North Am. Provision
Co. v. Fischer Lime & Cement Co. 168 Ark. 106,269 S.W. 993 (1925) (sales by wholesale merchants
subject to bulk sales law); Michigan Packing Co. v. Messaris, 257 Mich. 422, 241 N.W. 236 (1932)
(restaurants' supplies should be protected by bulk sales statute).
8. See Ganz v. Kovatch Corp. (In re Wicaco Mach. Co.), 55 Bankr. 588, 591 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985) (court considers inventory's fair market value and debtor's tax return to compute 50% figure
that determines " major part" of inventory), appeal denied 60 Bankr. 415 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Martin
Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 946, 950 (D.N.J.) (extracted sand basis of
measuring inventory, not sand remaining in ground), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 653 F.2d 799
(3d Cir. 1981); In re Albany Brick Co., 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 165 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
1972) (one third of inventory not major part of inventory). See also W. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM
CoMMERCIAL CoDE SERIES 6-28 to 6-29 (1984) (urges addition of new subsection to 6-102 defining
"major part" as "more than fifty percent in fair market value of the transferor's total inventory");
Miller, Bulk Sales Law: Meaning to be Attached to the Quantitative and Qualitative Requirements
Phases of the Statutes, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 283, 320 (major part means more than one half).
Revised U.C.C. § 6-102(1)(c)(ii) defines a bulk sale as "a sale ... of more than half the seller's
inventory, as measured by value."
9. See, e.g., First Nat'1 Bank v. Crone, 157 Ind. App. 665, 671, 301 N.E.2d 378, 382 (1973)
("sale must be . . . a rare and irregular event, occurring but few times in life of a merchant");
National Bank v. Frydlewicz, 67 Mich. App. 417, 241 N .W.2d 471 (1976) (extraordinary transaction, outside day-to-day operation, is not in ordinary course). But see Murdock v. Plymouth Enters.,
Inc. (In re Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 969, 977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (inventory liquidation
sale in ordinary course where typical to transferor's industry, routine for transferor, and did not
result in discontinuance of any line of transferor's business); Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey
Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 946 (D.N.J.) (large sale of sand in ordinary course because not atypical
based on nature of business), ajf'd in part. remanded in part, 653 F.2d 779 {3d Cir. 1981).
10. u.c.c. § 6-105.
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The bulk sale may be construed in misrepresentation terms 11 from the perspective of a consensual (contract) creditor of the bulk transferor ("transferor").
The creditor supplies the transferor with goods or services and is willing to extend the transferor unsecured trade credit, relying on the apparent corpus of
tangible assets. The creditor assumes that the transferor is stationary; the
debtor-transferor's visible assets will provide a source of payment should the
transferor become unwilling or unable to pay. To realize the value of those assets the creditor must simply attach the inventory either provisionally or by executing on a judgment against the transferor. 12 It is not clear, however, that the
creditor's understanding of commercial law, including issues of provisional or
postjudgment attachment, comports with reality. The transferor's visible assets
might have been encumbered by a prior collateral interest in favor of an all
assets lender. 13 Indeed, the very goods delivered to the transferor by the creditor may be subject to the prior claim of a secured party by operation of an afteracquired property clause in the security agreement between the transferor and
its secured creditor. 14 Similarly, the bulk sale eliminates those assets upon
which the creditors initially relied when contracting with the transferor. From
the creditors' perspective, the bulk sale retroactively effects a misrepresentation
concerning the financial condition of the transferor.
This essay will not argue that the creditor protection afforded under bulk
sales law makes sense. Certainly, there are responsible arguments supporting
the ALI's and NCCUS~'s recommendation that Article 6 be repealed. 15 Were
all who sell goods and services on open account sufficiently sophisticated, they
would research their customers' creditworthiness more thoroughly and even obtain purchase money collateral interests where feasible. 16 Alternatively, it could
be argued that, in most cases, providing goods on open account is economically
11. SeeP. ALCES. THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS 114.03(2), at 4-10 (1989) (citing
Elliot Grocer Co. v. Field's Pure Food Mkt., Inc., 286 Mich. 112, 114, 281 N.W. 557, 558 (1938)
(sale of fixtures without accompanying sale of merchandise violated bulk sales statute because depleted visible assets on which creditor would rely)).
Dean Robert Clark discerned four consistent concerns that determine the duties of a debtor to
its creditors: truth, respect, evenhandedness, and nonhinderance. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate
Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REv. 505, 509-12 (1977). Application of these principles to bulk
transactions illustrates the affinity between the bulk sales and fraudulent disposition law. Alces, The
Confluence ofBulk Transfer and Fraudulent Disposition Law, 41 ALA. L. REV. 821, 840-42 nn. 71-79
(1990).
12. See generally T. CRANDALL, R. HAGEDORN & F. SMITH, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW MANUAL (1985 & Supp. 1989) (thorough survey of provisional and postjudgment remedies available to
the creditor of bulk transferor).
13. An "all assets lender'' would have a perfected collateral interest in all of the debtor's personal property by operation of U .C. C. Art. 9 ( 1987).
14. u.c.c. § 9-204.
15. See Revised U.C.C. Art. 6, Prefatory Note; Rapson, U.CC Article 6: Should It Be Revised
or 'Deep-Sixed'?, 38 Bus. LAW. 1753 (1983) (usefulness of Article 6 unclear for present day transactions; draft revisions are improvement but fall short of what is needed).
16. U.C.C. § 9-312(3), (4). These subsections assure priority of purchase money security interests (PMSis) over earlier nonpurchase money interests that might be asserted under after-acquired
property clauses. U.C.C. § 9-312 comment 3. Otherwise, the prior collateral interest in after-acquired property would generally prevail. U.C.C. §§ 9-204, 9-312(5).
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rational. That is, in most commercial events, nothing goes wrong with a deal,
from contracting to delivery to payment. Consequently, it would not be sensible
for a supplier to paper all deals with the legal safeguards necessary in only a
small fraction of cases.
But the commercial fraud law generally 17 and the bulk sales law particularly, vouchsafe after-the-fact adjustment of equities in ways that do not take
into account a before-the-fact appraisal of the relative economic postures of the
parties. For example, suppose that a creditor is left with a virtually worthless
claim in bankruptcy while another party is in possession of goods manufactured
through the use of materials made available to the debtor-transferor by that
creditor. Courts may entertain theories that would ensure the compensation of
the aggrieved creditor, even at the expense of a putative buyer in the ordinary
course who later is identified as a bulk transferee. The balance of equities will
almost certainly be affected by the state of affairs that exists at the time the bulk
sale is challenged. IS
Accepting the misrepresentation basis of the bulk sales law and appreciating the courts' willingness to reorder the claims of parties in bankruptcy, it may
not be difficult to formulate the bulk sales cause of action in terms that parallel
actual fraud principles. The bulk transferee, though perhaps not aware that
there was an existing trade creditor relying on the transferor's inventory, may be
chargeable with the knowledge that a sale of a majority of the transferor's stock
could prejudice the interests of those who do business on open account with the
transferor. 19 Of course, if the proceeds of the bulk sale are injected back into the
business or used more directly to discharge outstanding claims, trade creditors
have no standing to complain. In the aftermath of a bulk sale, however, the
proceeds are often not injected back into the business or used to discharge creditors' claims. It is in such instances, where the transferor does not act as a responsible fiduciary of his creditors' interests, 20 that the case may move into a
17. See generally Statute of 13 Elizabeth, ch. 5 (1571); Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
7A U.L.A. 161 (1978) [hereinafter UFCA]; Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 639
(1985) [hereinafter UFfA]; 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (1988).
18. Just as a bulk sale divests the transferor of its assets, the transaction may signal the failure
of the business. A bulk sale is, necessarily, an unusual event. See National Bank v. Frydlewicz. 67
Mich. App. 417, 423, 241 N.W.2d 471, 471 (1976)(sale of retail stock after store closing is extraordinary transaction). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Crone, 157 Ind. App. 665, 671, 301 N.E.2d 378, 38182 (1973) {bulk sales act applies when sale extraordinary, "a rare and irregular event, occurring but
few times in life of a merchant") (citing Sternberg v. Rubenstein, 305 N.Y. 235, 112 N.E.2d 210
(1953)).
19. Cf. Adrian Tabin Corp. v. Climax Boutique, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 210, 220, 313 N.E.2d 66, 72,
356 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614 (1974) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting) (Article 6 contemplates, or should be construed to contemplate, imposition of burden on transferee to inquire into existence and extent of
creditors' claims against transferor).
20. Cf. K.rivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National Distillers & Chern. Co., 483 F.2d 1098, 1102-03,
(1973), modified, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974) (indicates creditor control and dominance over
debtor's affairs may establish liability); A.G. Jensen Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285,
290-94 (Minn. 1981) (primary creditor's exercise of substantial control over debtor's affairs gives rise
to liability).
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bankruptcy court. It may then be determined that the transferee was in the best
position to avoid the consequences of the apparent "fraud."

A. Fraud and the Bulk Transfer Law
In several important ways, bulk sales liability is akin to constructive fraud
liability. That is, a transfer may be rendered "ineffective" merely because the
plaintiff did not receive proper notice of the bulk sale. 21 Liability does not arise
because the parties to the bulk transfer schemed to deprive the creditor of its
property or of its interest in the property of the transferor. To prevail in the
bulk sales action, the plaintiff need not establish the animus of the bulk transferor or transferee. Prejudice to the interests of the creditor is presumed
notwithstanding evidence that the transfer was not the efficient cause of the prejudice to the creditor's position. 22 There is also no requirement that the plaintiff
creditor demonstrate prejudice in fact. 23 In that way, bulk sales liability accrues
in much the same way as constructive fraudulent disposition liability accrues
under the uniform state law on fraudulent transfers24 and the Bankruptcy
Code. zs So long as the claimant in a fraudulent disposition action establishes the
bases of avoidance (generally impaired financial condition of debtor and debtor's
receipt of inadequate consideration from the transferee), 26 the law does not care
21. u.c.c. § 6-105.
22. This might explain why the bulk sales law lacks any express remedial provision. It is not
clear exactly what rights are provided for the victim of either a complying or noncomplying bulk
sale.
23. But cf. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) which provides:
[T)he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property . . .
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if
(A) the case was a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
This element of a preference requires some improvement in the transferee's position over what the
transferee would have received in a hypothetical liquidation of the debtor's assets. This implies that
other creditors have been prejudiced. Absent such prejudice to the other creditors of the debtor, the
transfer is not avoidable.
24. See UFTA §§ 4(a)(2), S(a) (debtor must receive reasonably equivalent value); UFCA §§ 4-6
(debtor must receive fair consideration).
25. See II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (debtor may not receive less than reasonably equivalent value).
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a). Section 548(a) provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer ... if the debtor ... received less than a reasonably
equivalent value ... [and) was insolvent . .. or became insolvent as a result ... [or] was
engaged in business ... for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital ... [or) believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be
beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
See also UFCA § 4 (conveyance made by person thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent if
without fair consideration); UFCA § 5 (conveyance made without fair consideration when person
making it engaged in business or transaction for which remaining property is unreasonably small
capital is fraudulent); UFCA § 6 (conveyance made without fair consideration when person making
conveyance intends or believes he will incur debts beyond ability to pay is fraudulent); UFfA § 4(a)
(transfer made is fraudulent if debtor made transfer without receiving reasonably equivalent value
and was engaged in transaction for which remaining assets were unreasonably small or debtor rea-
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whether the plaintiff.creditor was in fact harmed; prejudice is presumed, as it is
in the bulk sales law.
Given the misrepresentation basis of bulk sales liability, the breadth of the
class of potential plaintiffs under the current bulk sales law confirms that constructive fraud principles support the imposition of liability. Section 6·109 of
Article 6 provides that all creditors "holding claims based on transactions or
events occurring before the bulk transfer" are entitled to prior notice of the bulk
sale and have standing to attack the sale if they do not receive the required
notice. Thus, in addition to the contract creditors of the transferor, tort claim·
ants (nonconsensual creditors) may set aside the bulk sale. That is so even
though the nonconsensual creditors never relied on the corpus of the trans·
ferors's assets, and notwithstanding the fact that their claims may not be
liquidated. 27
The next step in the analysis is to describe the elements of actual fraud in
the fraudulent disposition setting, focusing on their evolution in terms that will
be relevant when applying the general fraudulent disposition law to bulk sales.
That survey, combined with the foregoing conclusions regarding the nature of
bulk sales fraud liability, foreshadows the effort to draw parallels between the
constructive fraud and actual fraud law. An appreciation of those parallels is a
prerequisite to determining transferee liability issues under the proposed bulk
sales regime.
B. Actual Intent to Defraud in Fraudulent Disposition Law
Fraudulent disposition law developed early in commercial jurisprudence,
claiming roots in the Roman statutes,28 and assuming the form we would per·
haps first recognize in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, a penal statute.2 9 Accord·
ingly, liability under the specific language of the statute was actual fraud
liability. The statute proscribed all conveyances effected with the "actual intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors of the transferor. 30 Recognition of con·
structive fraud liability began in earnest with Twyne's Case.31 In that case, the
court enumerated the so·called "badges of fraud" as an adjunct of actual fraud
liability. 32 The badges of fraud focused on indicia of prejudice to the creditors
of the grantor rather than on any specific showing that prejudice had in fact
resulted. Development of the badges, and, therefore, the bases of constructive
sonably should have believe he [she] would incur debts beyond ability to pay); UFfA § 5(a) (transfer
is fraudulent if debtor made transfer without receiving reasonably equivalent value and debtor was
insolvent or became insolvent as result).
27. See U.C.C. § 6-109 comment 1 (creditors, including those with unliquidated claims, who
may have rights under various provisions of Article 6, identified by § 6-109(1)).
28. See 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCES & PREFERENCES § 60, at 82 (Rev. ed.
1940) (origins offraudulent conveyances); Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law, 18 VA. L.
REv. 109 (1931) (Roman law compelled distinction between actual and constructive fraud).
29. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 27, § 6lc, at 93.
30. See id. § 6lc, at 93. See also, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. ch. 2 (UFCA) app. at 309 (Purdon
1954) (text of Statute of 13 Elizabeth, ch. 5, Rob. Dig. 295).
31. 3 Coke Rep. SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
32. /d. The court listed the badges of fraud as follows:
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fraud liability, resulted from an evidentiary predicament: how to prove an actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. 33 So conceived, actual and constructive
fraud liability are symbiotically related avoidance theories. 34 That relationship
underlies the formulation of actual and constructive fraud liability from the
Statute of 13 Elizabeth, through the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
("UFCA"), to the most recent enactments, Bankruptcy Code Section 548 and
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFfA").
1. Statute of 13 Elizabeth and Twyne's Case

The Statute of 13 Elizabeth codified fraudulent disposition law in terms of
actual intent to defraud, and the case law that elaborated on the statute's proscription, most notably Twyne 's Case, focused on those indicia from which an
intent to defraud might be inferred. 35 Insofar as the object of an intent to defraud the creditors of the transferor would be manifest in actions that compromised the interests of those creditors, and in light of the fact that the creditors'
concern is entirely with the transferor's ability to satisfy its indebtedness, the
objective indicia of fraudulent intent address those actions that affect the financial condition of the transferor.
The Twyne's Case badges of fraud may all be understood in terms of their
relation to the financial condition of the transferor and to the implicit or actual
misrepresentation of that financial condition. The four badges of fraud having
the most contemporary significance are: (1) general gift (disposition of all or
substantially all of the transferor's assets); (2) ostensible ownership (transferor
1st. That this gift had the signs and marks of fraud, because the gift is general, without
exception of his apparel, or any thing of necessity; for it is commonly said, quod dolus
versatur in generalibus.
2nd. The donor continued in possession, and used them as his own; and by reason
thereof he traded and trafficked with others, and defrauded and deceived them.
3rd. It was made in secret, et dona clandestina sunt semper suspiciosa.
4th. It was made pending the writ.
Sth. Here was a trust between the parties, for the donor possessed all, and used them
as his proper goods, and fraud is always apparelled and clad with a trust, and a trust is a
cover of fraud.
6th. The deed contains, that the gift was made honestly, truly and bonafide: et clausae
inconsuet' semper inducunt suspicionem.
Jd. at 80b-8la, 76 Eng. Rep. at 812-14 (footnotes omitted).
33. For cases construing the badges of fraud in evidentiary terms, see, e.g., Bank of Josephine v.
Hopson, 516 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1974) (transfer by debtor anticipating suit is badge of fraud); Interstate Acceptance Corp. v. Lovins, 380 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1964) (mere sale of house quickly and at low
price not fraud); Watson v. Harris, 435 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. 1968) (intent to place property beyond
creditor reach evidence of fraud); Allison v. Mildred, 307 S. W .2d 447 (Mo. 1957) (use of strawman
in transaction evidence of fraud); Everett v. Gainer, 269 N.C. 528, 153 S.E.2d 90 (1967) (intrafamilial conveyance raises suspicion of fraud).
34. See Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 778 (1984) (intent
difficult to prove; thus, fraudulent conveyance law also has objective standard to supplement).
35. See 3 Coke Rep. at SOb, 76 Eng. Rep. at 811 (debtor made preferential transfer prior to
issuance of writ of execution on debtor's property). The court found sufficient evidence to infer an
actual intent to defraud because of the coincidence of the six badges of fraud. I d. at 80b-81a, 76 Eng.
Rep. at 812-14.
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retained possession of the assets notwithstanding surrender of title in them to a
third party); (3) clandestine disposition; and (4) disposition in anticipation of
litigation (self-imposed insolvency).36 Those financial condition indicia have retained their significance as fraudulent disposition law has evolved.
2. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
In the United States, the UFCA retained the Statute of 13 Elizabeth language proscribing conveyances effected with the "actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud." 37 One goal of the UFCA, and perhaps the primary one, was to
refine the objectification of fraudulent disposition law by concentrating on the
financial condition indicia of actual fraud . The drafters of the UFCA endeavored to address "the confusions and uncertainties of the [then] existing law,"
particularly the courts' "attempt to make the Statute of Elizabeth cover all conveyances which wrong creditors, even though the actual intent to defraud does
not exist."38 The drafters confirmed that the law under the Statute of 13 Elizabeth had operated to avoid transfers that resulted in prejudice to creditors, even
"where an intent to defraud on the part of the debtor does not exist." 39 To
clarify the law, the UFCA drafters distilled from the cases the reasoning supporting the decisions to assure that the statute would provide courts with the
guidance necessary to reach just decisions. The result was development of the
constructive bases of fraudulent disposition liability, emphasizing the financial
condition of the transferor at the time of and as a result of the conveyance.
Substantively, the UFCA clarified the indicia of debtor insolvency40 and defined
the "fair consideration" requirement relating to the adequacy of the consideration a transferor received in exchange for the assets conveyed.
The concepts underlying the Act's two-pronged definition of "fair consideration" provide the analytical roadmap from which to track the development and
occasional convergence of actual and constructive fraud. Under the UFCA, a
transferee gives fair consideration if the transferee gives a "fair equivalent" in
"good faith ." 41 What the transferee gives the transferor in return for the property conveyance that is the subject of the UFCA action must be the fair
36. The two badges not considered here but listed in Twyne's Case, creation of trust and protestations of bona fides, are not pertinent to the typical bulk sale. Cf UFfA § 4 comment 5 (use of
trust and recitations of good faith no longer significant evidence of fraud).
37. See UFCA § 7.
38. UFCA, Prefatory Note.
39. /d.
40. See id. (earlier uncertainty in law stemmed from absence of definite conception of insolvency).
41. UFCA § 3(a). The UFCA definition of fair consideration is further bifurcated, distinguishing between the fair consideration measure in outright transfers and collateral transfers. For a
discussion of the anomaly of that distinction, see Sabella, When Enough Is Too Much: Overcollateralization as a Fraudulent Conveyance, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 773, 776 n.17 (1987) (absolute conveyances
covered by UFCA § 3(a) and fair consideration means "fair equivalent" for property conveyed;
section 3(b) covers loan security transfers; need greater parity of value for transaction to pass § 3(a)
standards).
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equivalent of the property received by the transferee and the transferee must give
that fair equivalent in "good faith," a term undefined in the Act.
The purpose of the fair equivalent requirement is to assure that a creditor of
the transferor could set aside a conveyance that either substantially depletes the
corpus of the transferor's assets or occurs when the financial condition of the
transferor is already compromised. While the law will not police all transactions
that might not ultimately prove beneficial to a party who has creditors, it will
intercede to protect the interests of those creditors when the financial condition
of the transferor is impaired. It is precisely in those circumstances that a creditor's interests would be prejudiced in the same way as if the transferor had an
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditor. Thus, from the creditor's
perspective, the state of mind of an insolvent transferor is irrelevant; the result is
the same whether the challenged conveyance was the product of animus (actual
fraud) or merely the lack of business acumen (constructive fraud). The appropriateness of the commercial fraud law's intercession to protect the creditors'
position in the constructive rather than actual fraud setting is debatable.42
Nonetheless, it is clear that the UFCA (and its statutory successors) vindicates
such treatment.
If this were the extent of the UFCA constructive fraud provisions, it might
still be unclear to some that the constructive and actual fraud theories share
a fundamental affinity after the promulgation of the UFCA. But, in addition
to the requirement that the value given by the transferee be adequate, the definition of fair consideration requires a showing that the transferee gave the consideration in good faith. As Professor Kennedy has explained, the good faith
requirement operates to police conveyances to insiders,43 those peculiarly well
positioned to take advantage of the transferor. 44 Good faith considerations
focus on the subjective state of mind of the transferee. 45 The courts have noted
42. Compare Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND.
L. REv. 829, 831-40 (1985) (argues that creditor monitoring, rather than fraudulent conveyance law,
should control debtor misbehavior where consensual creditor would wish to restrict or prohibit certain debtor activities) with Smyser, Going Private and Going Under: Leveraged Buyouts and the
Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 781, 784 (1988) (argues broad application of fraudulent conveyance statutes necessary to protect creditor interests even where specific contractual provisions restricting certain debtor activities might not be desired).
43. See Kennedy, The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 195, 205 (1986) (elimination of good faith requirement would make avoidance of preferential transfers to insiders impossible). But see Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARV. L. REV. 495, 503 (1983)
(invalidation of preferences would merely "replace one recipient of the debtor's property with
another").
44. See Alces & Dorr, A Critical Analysis of the New Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 1985 U.
ILL L. REV. 527, 551-57 (discusses inclusive nature of insider status under Bankruptcy Code and
UFfA; questions why drafters juxtaposed intentionally nonexclusive modifier "includes" with such
extensive specification of relationships giving rise to insider status). Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (1988)
(insider defined in terms of specific relationships); UFfA § 1(7) (same).
45. See U.C.C. § l-201(19) (subjective definition of good faith: "honesty in fact"). But see
U.C.C. § 2-l03(l)(b) (objective test of good faith regarding merchants: "observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing").

1990]

BULK TRANSFEREE LIABILITY

689

a direct relationship between the lack of good faith and the existence of indicia
of an actual intent to defraud under the UFCA. Three cases are illustrative.
In Gifford-Hill & Co. v. Stol/er,46 a state court considered an intrafamilial
transfer, which is always suspect.47 The husband had conveyed property to his
wife within one week after a creditor initiated an action against him. The court
considered the relationship between an actual intent to defraud and the good
faith element of fair consideration under the UFCA.
'(G]ood faith,' among other characteristics, encompasses an absence
or freedom from intent to defraud. Consequently, good faith and
fraud are mutually exclusive terms; the presence of one excludes the
existence of the other in the same subject. A lack of good faith is
demonstrated by a transferee's participation in a plan to hinder creditors, even though the transfer may be supported by adequate
consideration.48
Under the UFCA, the good faith element of fair consideration is relevant
only in constructively fraudulent conveyances. The Stoller court, however,
found a symbiotic relationship between good faith and fraud by inferring actual
fraudulent intent from a lack of good faith. If the court's reasoning is correct,
the distinction between actual and constructive fraud begins to blur.
In Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Derber, 49 a Washington appellate court reviewed the actions of an attorney-transferee of property. The court concluded
that the attorney had not taken in good faith because the attorney was aware of
the transferor's "chaotic financial situation" at the time of the conveyance. The
court was troubled by the uneasy relationship between the lack of good faith, as
an element of constructive fraud, and the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. To resolve the perceived tension, the court relied on an earlier Washington decision - Tacoma Association of Credit Men v. Lester. so In .Lester the
46. 221 Neb. 757, 380 N.W.2d 625 (1986).
47. UFI'A § 3 comment 2 (explains that value requirement will not be satisfied by consideration having no utility from creditor's viewpoint, such as love and affection). See, e.g., United States
v. West, 299 F. Supp. 661, 664 (D. Del. 1969) (intrafamilial transaction alleged to be fraudulent
more closely scrutinized than if between strangers, because fraud easily practiced and effectively
concealed; Springfield Ins. Co. v. Fry, 267 F. Supp. 693, 695 (N.D. Okla. 1967) (property transfers
between husband and wife neither invalid nor fraudulent by inference, but such transactions more
closely scrutinized than those between unrelated parties); Toledo Trust Co. v. Poole (In re Poole), 15
Bankr. 422, 432 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (transfers between husband and wife or between family
members suspect and subject to strictest scrutiny, particularly when consideration supporting transfer inadequate); Kirkland v. Risso, 98 Cal. App. 3d 971, 978-79, 159 Cal. Rptr. 798, 802 (1979)
(transactions between close relatives not presumed fraudulent, but, when confidential relationship
exists, parties held to fuller and stricter proof of fairness); Richards v. Jones, 16 Del. Ch. 227, 232,
142 A. 832, 835 (1928); Sandler v. Parlapiano, 236 A.D. 70, 71, 258 N.Y.S. 88, 90 (1932) (transfer
made to near relatives without real consideration may be considered as likely to be in fraud of
creditors); P. ALCES, supra note 11, ~ 5.01[1][b], at S-5 to 5-6 (citing Orbach v. Pappa, 482 F. Supp.
117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (in intrafamily transaction, heavier burden exists to establish fair consideration for transfer)).
48. 221 Neb. at 764-65, 380 N.W.2d at 630 (citing Filley v. Mancuso, 146 Neb. 493, 20 N.W.2d
318 (1945)).
49. 4 Wash. App. 341, 481 P.2d 585 (1971).
SO. 72 Wash. 2d 453, 433 P.2d 901 (1967).
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court delineated three factors pertinent to the transferee good faith calculus:
(1) honest belief in the propriety of the challenged conveyance; (2) no intent to
take unconscionable advantage of others; (3) no intent to hinder, delay, or defraud others. 51 The Derber court adopted that approach and attempted to identify a distinction between the constructive and actual fraudulent conveyance
law. The court found a difference in the evidentiary burden. The court held
that the plaintiff must satisfy the "clear and satisfactory proof" standard to
prove actual fraud. 52 To establish the lack of good faith basis of constructive
fraud, however, the plaintiff must merely provide "substantial evidence" that
any one of the three enumerated Lester bases was not satisfied. 53 Whether or
not there is a real difference between those two evidentiary standards is arguable.
It is clear, however, that the distinction drawn by the Derber court does not
come ready-made in the UFCA. Rather, the Derber decision posits the fundamental affinity between the actual and constructive fraudulent disposition law.
3. Bankruptcy Code Section 548
The Bankruptcy Refonn Act of 1978 modernized the debtor-creditor law.
In so doing, it clarified fraudulent disposition law in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding. Section 548 of the Code, "Fraudulent Transfers," addresses the perceived incongruities of the predecessor enactments, including the UFCA. 54 Section 548 empowers a bankruptcy trustee to avoid those prebankruptcy transfers·
later deemed to be fraudulent. For present purposes, two aspects of section 548
are particularly noteworthy: the provision's continuation of the actual fraud
language of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth and replacement of the "fair consideration" definition with the concept of "reasonably equivalent value."
Notwithstanding the passage of a few hundred years, the drafters of the late
twentieth century bankruptcy law were not able to improve on the proscription
against transfers effected with the "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud"
creditors of the transferor. 55 So the actual fraud jurisprudence that developed
around that formulation is pertinent under the actual fraud provision of section
548.
Recognizing the problematic nature of including a good faith element in the
fair consideration calculus, however, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code
dropped the good faith concept from the avoidance provision of the constructive
fraudulent transfer law and retained it only in the savings clause:
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under
this section is voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a
transferee or obligee of such transfer or obligation that takes for value
and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred,
or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the
51. /d. at 458, 433 P.2d at 904 (emphasis added).
52. 4 Wash. App. at 349, 481 P.2d at 591.
53. /d.
54. II U.S.C. § 548(a). See supra note 26 for the pertinent text of§ 548(a).
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (trustee may avoid transfer made "with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud" creditor).
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extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation. S 6
The absence of a good faith element in the reasonably equivalent value concept
seems to distinguish constructive fraud from actual fraud more clearly than the
earlier statutory approaches. Nonetheless, the financial condition bases of constructive fraud in section 548 are essentially similar to the Twyne's Case badges
of fraud. So the confluence of actual and constructive fraud law that began in
Twyne's Case and continued through the UFCA is preserved in Bankruptcy
Code section 548. Indeed, it comes full circle in the latest incarnation of fraudulent disposition law promulgated by the NCCUSL - the UFTA.
4. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
Like its predecessors, the UFTA proscribes transfers effected with the "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors of the transferor.s7 The Act
also provides for the avoidance of constructively fraudulent transfers - that is,
those in which the transferee exchanges for less than a reasonably equivalent
value at a time when the transferor's financial condition is or may be compromised. ss So the tension between the actual and constructive fraud law remains
much the same as it is under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The UFfA, however, surpasses the earlier enactments by providing a catalogue of indicia of fraudulent intent to complement the actual fraud provision. S 9
The catalogue tracks substantially the Twyne's Case badges offraud.60 Three of
the indicia, however, collapse actual and constructive fraud law:
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was [not] reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount
of the obligation incurred;
56. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (emphasis added). Under the UFCA, good faith is also a part of the
savings provision by operation of the fair consideration concept in that section. UFCA § 9 provides
that:
(l) Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, such creditor, when his
claim has matured, may, as against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration
without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase, or one who has derived title
immediately or mediately from such a purchaser,
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation annulled to the extent necessary to
satisfy his claim, or
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution upon the property
conveyed.
(2) A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than a fair considera·
tion for the conveyance or obligation, may retain the property or obligation as security for
repayment.
57. UFfA § 4(a)(l).
58. /d. §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a).
59. /d. § 4(b).
60. Twyne's Case, 3 Coke Rep. 80b, 80b-8la, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 812-14 (Star Chamber 1601).
The court recognized six badges of fraud: 1) gifts of substantially all of the debtor's assets; 2) gifts
with donor's continuing in possession; 3) gifts made in secret; 4) gifts pending litigation; 5) gifts in
trust; and 6) gifts reciting that they are made in good faith. /d. See also supra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Twyne Case.
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(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred[.]61
Those indicia of actual fraud are also indicia of constructive fraud. The crucial
and curious difference is that to establish constructive fraud the plaintiff creditor
must establish both the impaired financial condition of the transferor and the
inadequacy of the value given in exchange by the transferee. 62 But the mere fact
of inadequacy of value or insolvency of the transferor constitutes an indicator of
actual fraud sanctioned by the UFTA. 63 So, if establishing a single factor is ever
construed as sufficient proof of actual fraud, it may be a less onerous burden for
the plaintiff to establish actual fraud than to establish constructive fraud. The
paradox lies in the amorphous nature of fraud itself.64
The next section of this article considers other contexts, including Article 6
bulk transfers law, in which the actual/constructive fraud law paradox has been
played out.
C The Convergence of Constructive and Actual Fraud

The foregoing survey of the fraudulent disposition statutes has posited the
tension between the constructive and actual fraud bases for transfer avoidance.
The survey described the circular development of the relationship between actual and constructive fraud. Much as Gilmore described the merger of contract
into tort, 6 s the constructive fraud bases of avoidance are being merged into the
actual fraud jurisprudence. Before considering the ramifications·of the conclusions offered here for the new bulk transfer regime, 66 it is necessary to bring the
actuaVconstructive fraud tension into sharper focus. The next part of this essay
examines the courts' analysis of a transfer that occurs frequently in bankruptcy.
This analytical tension also emerges in the bulk sales setting.
I. Conversion of Non-Exempt Property
Under both federal bankruptcy law67 and state debtor-creditor law68 cer61. UFfA § 4(8)- (10) comments 5, 6.
62. See UFfA § 4(a)(2), (5)(a).
63. See generally UFTA § 4(b) (factors used in determining actual intent).
64. See Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 371, 167 N.E. 501, 503 (1929) (Cardozo, C.J.)
(phases of fraud are manifold). See a/so 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE.
AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA§ 186, at 212 n.5 (1846) (fraud is infinite; were there
strict rules defining fraud, relief would be perpetually eluded by new schemes) (quoting letter from
Lord Hardwicke to Lord Kaims (June 30, 1759)).
65. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87-90 (1974) (growth of quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel indicates dissolution of classic contract consideration theory and merger with tort theories of liability).
66. See infra notes 113-254 and accompanying text for a discussion of the likely results of
changing the bulk sales law.
67. II u.s.c. § 522 (1988).
68. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 703.140(b) (West Supp. 1984); GA. CoDE ANN. § 44-
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tain property is exempt from the claims of creditors.69 The object is to assure
that the law does not produce so much debtor hardship for the sake of creditors'
rights that the debtor is denied any real opportunity to rehabilitate itself.
Bankruptcy courts have had some difficulty determining whether a debtor's
conversion of nonexempt property into exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy constitutes an actual intent to defraud creditors of the debtor or is merely
unassailable strategic planning. 70 The tests developed by the courts refl.ect ac·tual fraud indicia, focusing on the state of mind of the debtor to determine
whether the debtor's actions were intended to hinder, delay, or defraud the
debtor's creditors. The test posited by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in Bank ofPennsylvania v. Ad/man (In reAd/man) 71 focused
on whether there is "convincing evidence of extrinsic fraud." The court reasoned that absent such a finding, the conversion would not constitute a fraudulent transfer. 72 The Ad/man case concerned use of the proceeds from the sale of
nonexempt real property to purchase exempt life insurance. 73 That is the type
of exempt property that has been in issue in several of the leading conversion
cases.
A similar scenario was examined more recently by a bankruptcy court in
Staats v. Beckman (In re Beckman).14 In that case the challenged conversion
was deemed fraudulent. As a basis for its conclusion, the Beckman court moved
beyond the vague test of Ad/man and developed a list of seven indicia of an
actual intent to defraud when nonexempt assets are converted into exempt insurance just prior to bankruptcy. The list bears reproduction both to demonstrate
its similarity to the badges of fraud and, therefore, to constructive fraud law, as
well as to support the conclusion that in perhaps no area of the law is it more
13-100 (Supp. 1988); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-1001 (1989); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW
§§ 282, 283 (McKinney Supp. 1989); Tex. PROP. CoDE §§ 41.001, 42.001 (Vernon 1986).
69. Exemptions are limited not only to the certain categories of property, but often to certain
value amounts within those categories. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (various exemptions allowed
including motor vehicle value up to $1200); CAL CIV. PRoc. CODE§ 703.140(b)(4) (exemptions may
include debtor jewelry valued up to $500); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 12-1001(d) (exemptions
include up to $750 in debtor's equity interest in implements, professional books, or tools of trade of
debtor).
70. See Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Holt (In re Holt), 97 Bankr. 997 (Bankr. W.D. Ark.
1988) (knowing conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt assets is not fraudulent transfer), aff'd,
894 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Armstrong, 93 Bankr. 197 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988) (use of
proceeds from transfer of nonexempt assets to purchase exempt annuities is not fraudulent conveyance); Ernst v. O'Brien (In re O'Brien), 67 Bankr. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) {purchase of exempt
life insurance assets with proceeds from sale of nonexempt real estate is not fraudulent transfer). But
see Staats v. Beckman (/n re Beckman), 104 Bankr. 866 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (conversion of
nonexempt assets into unreasonable amount of exempt life insurance just prior to bankruptcy is
fraudulent transfer); Peoples State Bank & Trust Co. v. Sayler (In re Sayler), 100 Bankr. 57 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1988) {debtor insolvent at time of transfer and left with no remaining nonexempt assets
after conversion had actual intent to defraud), affd, 98 Bankr. 542 (D. Kan. 1989).
71. 541 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1976).
72. /d. at 1005.
73. /d. at 1001.
74. 104 Bankr. 866 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
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clear that "those who can analyze do, and those who cannot, number.''75 The
Beckman court enunciated the following factors:
(1) whether there was fair consideration paid for the life insurance
policy;
(2) whether the debtor was solvent or insolvent as a result of the transfer or whether he was insolvent at the time of the transfer;
(3) the amount of the policy;
(4) whether the debtor intended, in good faith, to provide by moderate
premiums some protection to those whom he bad a duty to support;
(5) the length of time between the purchasing of a life insurance policy
and the filing of the bankruptcy;
(6) the amount of non-exempt property which the debtor had after
purchasing the life insurance policy;
(7) the debtor's failure to produce available evidence and to testify
with significant preciseness as to the pertinent details of his activities
shortly before filing the bankruptcy petition. 76
The first two elements parallel the familiar bases of constructive fraudulent disposition avoidance.
Although the Beckman court blurred the distinction between actual and
constructive fraud, it did not rely solely on the enumerated indices in reaching
its determination of actual fraud. 77 Rather, the court was particularly impressed
by the fact that the debtor had not only failed to reveal the conversion but had
actually obscured the insurance purchase in its bankruptcy filing. 78 That preoccupation with concealment and the relationship between concealment and the
intent to defraud has also encroached upon the bulk sales law.
2. Degrees of Noncompliance with Article 6
Under Article 6, notice of an impending bulk transfer must be given to the
creditors of the transferor. 79 The transfer is deemed "ineffective" as to any creditor who does not receive the requisite notice. 80 Is there, however, a difference
between cases in which there is apparently an inadvertent failure to notify a
single creditor or two and those in which there is a conscious choice not to
comply with Article 6 and instead wait out the limitations period? Would it
matter what efforts the parties made to conceal the bulk transfer when there has
been a failure to comply through lack of notice? Is there a difference between
active concealment and mere failure to disclose? These are some of the questions the courts have confronted in determining liability issues under current
Article 6.
The fraudulent disposition statutes formulate different remedies for actual
75. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 1-3, at 30.
76. 104 Bankr. at 870 (emphasis added) (citing Mueller v. Redmond (In re Mueller), 867 F.2d
568, 570 (lOth Cir. 1989)).
77. /d. at 870-71.
78. Id. at 871.
79. u .c.c. § 6-105 (1989).
80. /d.
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and constructive fraud. 81 The remedies consider the proper parties plaintiff82
and the extent of potential recovery for each type of fraud. 83 Moreover, in identifying plaintiffs, the statutes distinguish between present and future creditors
and between those present creditors who knew of the fraudulent disposition and
those who did not. The constructive fraudulent disposition law presumes fraud
once the financial condition and insufficient value requisites are established;
81. See supra notes 37-53, 57-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the uniform
frandulent transfer acts.
82. Both the UFCA and the UFI'A distinguish actual intent to defraud from constructive fraud
in determining what types of creditors may attack the conveyance. UFCA § 7 and its counterpart in
the UFI'A, § 4(a)(l), both clearly provide that transfers made "with actual intent ... to hinder,
delay, or defraud" are fraudulent as to present and future creditors. Conversely, UFCA § 4 aQd
UFrA § 5(a), which deal with constructively fraudulent conveyances, render such dispositions
fraudulent as to existing creditors, but not to future creditors. The scope of those sections' proscription is limited to transactions in which the debtor was insolvent or was rendered insolvent by the
transaction and did not receive "fair consideration" or "reasonably equivalent value."
On the continuum between actual intent to defraud and purely constructive fraud are cases
involving equitable insolvency. These transactions, like those made with actual intent to defraud,
are fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. The provisions are concerned with the lack of
"a fair consideration" or "a reasonably equivalent value." Instead of actual insolvency, however, a
surrogate for intent to defraud is inferred from the debtor's financial situation. UFI'A § 4(a)(2)(i),
which is based on UFCA § 5, provides that a transfer is fraudulent if the debtor "was engaged or
was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were
unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction." Likewise, UFI'A § 4(a)(2)(ii), derived from UFCA § 6, characterizes as fraudulent transfers in which the debtor "intended to incur,
or believed or reasonably should have believed that he [or she) would incur, debts beyond his [or her)
ability to pay as they became due." These situations, though constructive bases of fraud, are more
similar to actual intent cases because they concern events in which a debtor would know or would
have reason to know of the consequences of its actions in light of its financial situation. Appropriately, as the fraud in issue moves on the continuum toward actual intent, future creditors are afforded the same rights they would receive were the transfer made with an actual intent to defraud.
83. See UFI'A § 8(a); UFCA § 9. The UFI'A contains a separate savings provision for cases
involving actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. The savings clause provides that transfers are
not voidable under UFTA § 4(a)(l), the actual intent provision, against persons taking in good faith
and for a reasonably equivalent value or against their transferees or obligees. UFTA § 8(a). Conversely, cases involving constructive fraud are covered by UFTA § 8(b), which permits recovery
from: (i) the initial transferee, regardless of his bona fides, (ii) the person for whose benefit the
transfer was made, and (iii) subsequent transferees who did not take in good faith or failed to give
value. /d.§ 8(b). Again, the shelter principle protects any subsequent transferee or obligee of a bona
fide transferee. UFTA § 8(b)(2). The comments to§ 8 do not explain this dichotomy, but state that
subsection 8(a) is drawn from UFCA § 9, and subsection 8(b) is drawn from Bankruptcy Code
§ 550(a). UFTA § 8 comments. The savings provisions of both UFCA § 9 and Bankruptcy Code
§ 550(a), however, fail to differentiate between actual and constructive fraud. See UFCA § 9 (provision applies to any fraudulent conveyance); ll U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988) (same).
Arguably, the dichotomy employed promotes equity by requiring creditors to seek recovery
from the malfeasant debtor under UFI'A § 8(a) while allowing recovery from a malfeasant debtor or
transferee under§ 8(b). This is justified by the constructive fraud basis of recovery in§ 8(b), under
which the immediate transferee will have to have given less than reasonably equivalent value for the
constructive fraud provision to operate against him. UFfA § 8(b). The UFCA, on the other hand,
does not distinguish between actual and constructive fraud in its savings clause. See UFCA § 9. It
merely provides that a creditor whose claim has matured may pursue his remedy "against any person except a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the
purchase, or one who has derived title immediately or mediately from such a purchaser. ... " /d.
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there is no requirement that a present creditor demonstrate any actual prejudice
resulting from the fraud.
In bulk sales law, such distinctions are not immediately apparent in the
language of the statute. While Article 6 provides that when there has been a
failure to comply with notice requirements, the transfer is rendered ineffective,
the statute does not expressly provide that the transfer is ineffective only as to
those creditors who did not receive the requisite notice. Professors White and
Summers, however, have suggested a reason to distinguish cases of "total noncompliance" from cases of "substantial but not full compliance. " 84 The White
and Summers construction, arguably supported by an official comment to section 6-104, 85 provides the basis for distinguishing an actual intent to defraud
(total noncompliance) from mere constructive fraud liability (substantial compliance). 86 So construed, the conclusion seems to do some violence to the statute
by making a problematic distinction between the bases of actual and constructive fraud to limit the class of proper parties plaintiff.87
A decision of a Connecticut court may shed some light on the characterization of the bulk transfer article as constructive fraud law. In Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Tabs, Inc., 88 the court considered a nonuniform version of section
6-105, which required that the transferor file public notice of a bulk sale in the
Office of the Secretary of State and send notice to its creditors by registered or
certified mail. 89 The complaining creditor had received the notice sent by certified mail, but the notice had not actually been filed with the Secretary of State. 90
The defendant argued that the purpose of the notice had in fact been realized
because the creditor had actually received the notice sent by certified mail. 91
The court rejected the argument and, relying on a strict construction of the statutory language, concluded that the notice deficiency rendered the transfer
ineffective. 92
It is not certain that the Tabs result is correct; indeed, the court's overall
84. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 20-24, at 908-10.
85. Jd. at 910 (author's interpretation strongly supported by U.C.C. § 6-104 comment 2 which
asserts that satisfying unpaid creditors always cures defect). The authors, however, acknowledge
that this comment can also be read to require the transferee to pay off all creditors. They dismiss
this reading because it would "deprive the word 'cure' in the comment of its usual meaning." /d.
86. See P. ALCES, supra note 11, ~ 4.04[4](b], at 4-54.
87. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, at 909. The authors argue that:
For remedial purposes we believe that it is necessary to distinguish between cases of
total noncompliance with Article Six and cases of substantial but not full compliance. .. .
We would make the punishment fit the crime and treat the transfer ineffective [sic] only as
against an aggrieved creditor and not against all creditors [in cases of partial
noncompliance].
!d.
88. 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1290 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979).
89. !d. at 1295 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-6-l06-(3)).
90. /d.
91. Jd.
92. See id. (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-6-106(3)). Specifically the court found that "[t]he
legislature used the word 'shall,' mandatory and not permissive language, and where the language is
plain, courts will not speculate as to any supposed intention of the legislature . . . . Both the filing
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fonnalistic analysis seems troublesome. 93 More significant than the court's
holding, however, is the court's attitude toward bulk sales law. Considering that
the transferor in Tabs sent notice to the creditor, it would be difficult to find any
intent to defraud. Evidently intent was not dispositive, since the court deemed
the transfer ineffective despite the transferor's bona fides. 94 If the Tabs analysis
accurately reflects the courts' attitude toward bulk sales law, it may be that the
distinction drawn by White and Summers between total noncompliance and substantial but not complete compliance may be assailable.
Further, the courts' reluctance to distinguish actual from constructive fraud
in bulk sales suggests that there may be no such distinction. Consequently,
under the current law, a transfer could be upset regardless of the absence of any
intent to defraud. Instead, the mere failure to comply scrupulously with bulk
sales notice requirements would establish the basis for avoidance. This reasoning implies that there is something inherently fraudulent about such a failure in
light of the potential prejudice to the creditors of the transferor.
The issue of whether degrees of compliance with Article 6 matter has been
the focus of several of the cases construing section 6-111, "Limitations of Actions and Levies." That section establishes a general six-month limitations period after a transfer for bringing an action. It further provides that "[i]f the
transfer has been concealed, actions may be brought or levies made within six
months after its discovery." 9 s The provision is facially incongruous given the
fact that a bulk sale effected in compliance with Article 6 would never have been
concealed from those with an interest in it. That is, for a bulk sale to comply
with Article 6, creditors of the transferor must receive notice of the sale.96 The
fact that the creditor did not receive the notice could certainly be evidence that
the transferor and transferee were "concealing'' the sale. The query, then, is
whether Article 6, in section 6-111, contemplates a distinction between intentional and inadvertent concealment. That issue arises when a complaining creditor brings suit more than six months after the bulk sale and alleges that the
transactors' failure to give the creditor notice constitutes 6-111 concealment,
tolling the statute of limitations. The more willing the courts are to toll the
limitations period as a result of mere noncompliance (rather than to require a
showing of active concealment), the more it seems that the bulk sales law is
concerned primarily with creditor protection. Nice distinctions between actual
and constructive fraud appear to be of less consequence. Further, courts' willingness to avoid transfers on account of mere noncompliance supports the conclusion that a failure to give notice constitutes the type of creditor prejudice
regulated by general fraudulent disposition principles. The cases demonstrate
the scope of the debate surrounding the specific section 6-111 concealment issue
with the secretary of state and the personal delivery or sending by registered mail are required." ld.
(emphasis in original).
93. See id. (analysis limited to statutory construction).
94. Jd.
95. u.c.c. § 6-111.
96. Jd. § 6-105.
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and the more general commercial fraud issues implicated. 97
In two decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that mere noncompliance does not constitute concealment. In In re Del
Norte Depot, Inc. 98 and In re Borba,99 the panels asserted that a common sense
construction of Article 6 compels the conclusion that some affirmative act of
concealment is necessary to toll the limitations period. 100 The Borba court reasoned that
[i]f failure to give notice is concealment, then the language [in Section
6-111] referring to the date the transferee took possession as the commencement of the running of the statute has no effect whatsoever, and
neither does reference [in Section 6-111] to the date of discovery of the
transfer if there has been concealment. 101
Several state courts have reached the same conclusion. In SVM Investment
v. Mexican Exporters, Inc., 102 a Texas appellate court decided that the complaining creditor either knew or should have known about the transfer on the
basis of the facts presented. 103 Similarly, in Pipeline Materials, Inc. v. Turf Irrigation Corp., 104 a Colorado appellate court found that because the transferee's
possession of the goods sold in bulk was open and notorious, there was no concealment notwithstanding the transactors' failure to comply with the statutory
notice requirements. tos
Other courts have demonstrated, by degrees, a different attitude toward the
concealment issue. A New York appellate court, in E.J. Trum, Inc. v.
Blanchard Parfums, Inc., 106 found that total noncompliance constituted section
97. See Lang v. Graham (In re Borba), 736 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1984) (failure to give notice of
impending bulk sale not concealment for purpose of tolling statute of limitation); Chartered Bank of
London v. Diamant (In re Del Norte Depot, Inc.), 716 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1983) (mere defects in
bulk transfer notice not concealment, given mechanisms other than bulk transfer notice adequate to
notify creditors of creation of security interest); Pipeline Materials, Inc. v. Turf Irrigation Corp., 754
P.2d 775 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (mere failure to notify of bulk transfer does not toll statute of limitations absent statutory language to contrary); SVM Investments v. Mexican Exporters, Inc., 685
S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985) (technical noncompliance with notice requirement not concealment where through informal notice actual knowledge of transfer communicated). See also E.J.
Trum, Inc. v. Blanchard Parfums, Inc., 33 A.D.2d 689, 306 N.Y.S.2d 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)
(noncompliance with notice requirements tantamount to concealment); Columbian Rope Co. v.
Rinek Cordage Co., 314 Pa. Super. 585, 461 A.2d 312 (1983) (complete failure to comply with notice
provisions of bulk transfer law constituted concealment).
1
98. Chartered Bank of London v. Diamant (In re Del Norte Depot, Inc.), 716 F.2d 557 (9th
Cir. 1983).
99. Lang v. Graham (In re Borba), 736 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1984).
100. In re Del Norte, 716 F.2d at 561; In re Borba, 736 F.2d at 1320.
101. In re Borba, 736 F . 2d at 1320. See also In re Del Norte, 716 F.2d at 561 n.7 (mere defect
in bulk transfer notice that has been filed, absent actual fraud, not concealment of transaction).
102. 685 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985).
103. /d. at 428-29 (creditor who conducted business with entity created after bulk transfer
made held to have had knowledge of transfer).
104. 754 P.2d 775 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
105. /d. at 776.
106. 33 A.D.2d 689, 306 N.Y.S.2d 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969).
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6-111 concealment. 107 Perhaps most noteworthy, however, is the decision of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Columbian Rope Co. v. Rinek Cordage Co. 108
That court considered the role of Article 6 in the general scheme of commercial
law and held that total noncompliance must be treated as concealment. The
court reasoned that any other outcome would encourage those transactors unwilling to afford creditors the Article 6 protections to assume the risk, for a brief
six month period, that the sale would be discovered. 109 The Rinek court characterized bulk transfer law in commercial fraud terms. The court found that "the
transferee's intent or scienter is not relevant to the harm the bulk transfer statute
seeks to prevent." 110 More crucially, the court doubted that "a transferee might
ordinarily purchase all of the transferor's stock in trade, thus rendering the
transferor a hollow shell, without considering or making provision for the transferor's creditors." 111 That is, the court recognized that a bulk transfer which
substantially impairs a creditor's rights establishes the type of fraud policed by
the commercial fraud law. Further, the court was willing to charge the transferees with knowledge of that prejudicial impact. Whether the transferor and
transferee intended harm is irrelevant: the fraud is accomplished by the
transfer. 112
107. !d. at 689, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 317. But see Aero1ineas Argentinas v. Hansen & Yorke Co.,
12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 329 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973) (Trum holding limited to particular
department of New York Supreme Court in which decided; complaining creditor must show more
than mere noncompliance) (citing Trum, 33 A.D.2d 689, 306 N .Y.S.2d 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)).
108. 314 Pa. Super. 585, 461 A.2d 312 (1983).
109. !d. at 591, 461 A.2d at 315.
llO. !d. at 592, 461 A.2d at 315 (citing]. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE§ 19-1, at 757 (2d ed. 1980) (transferees sometimes advised by attorneys not to comply with
Article 6 notice)).
lll. !d.
112. A comparison may be drawn with the scienter requirement attending misrepresentation
liability. While the tort of fraud or deception does carry an element of intent, courts are often
willing to settle for something less, imposing liability on the basis of recklessness, negligence, or even
strict liability principles. This relaxation of the scienter requirement allows courts to circumvent the
often elusive proof of the defendant's actual state of mind.
Liability for reckless misrepresentation represents something short of intent but more than negligence. Evidence that a statement was made irresponsibly, with knowledge and appreciation of the
risk involved, is sufficient to sustain the action for fraud. For a general discussion of these issues and
a survey of the pertinent cases, see P. ALCES, supra note 11, ~ 2.02[3)[a], at 2-17 to 2-18 (citing
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 642 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1986) (fraud
found based on defendant's reckless indifference for truth); Buechin v. Ogden Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 159 Ill. App. 3d 237, 511 N.E.2d 1330 (1987) (car dealer's failure to inform buyer car had been
driven 650 miles is fraudulent); Schatz v. Vidlak, 229 Neb. 4, 424 N.W.2d 613 (1988) (reckless
misrepresentation that gross profit was net profit is fraudulent)). For purposes of the comparison
here, the courts' preoccupation with the relative equitable posture of the parties is particularly noteworthy. Because a defendant is in a better position to appreciate the veracity of the representation, a
court may impose liability when a plaintiff has relied detrimentally on the representation. See, e.g.,
Duhl v. Nash Realty, Inc., 102 Ill. App. 3d 483, 429 N.E.2d 1267 (1981).
Liability for negligent misrepresentation represents a further expansion of fraud premised on
less than intentional misrepresentation. Whether by case law, or by statute, misrepresentations of
material facts, even if accomplished "by mistake," are actionable. See, e.g., Grenell v. City of
Harmosa Beach, 103 Cal. App. 3d 864, 163 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1980); ALA. CoDE§ 6-5-101 (1975). The
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Under this formulation of the bulk sales law, the focus is on the harm (and
potential harm) caused rather than the evil in transactors' hearts. With such a
focus, bulk sales law plays an important role in the commercial fraud law. Impairment of the operation of the current Article 6 would therefore leave a gap.
Before discussing the ALI and NCCUSL proposed alternatives to the current bulk sales regime, a summary of the premises formulated in this section is
useful:
(1) Bulk transfer law is premised on general commercial fraud
principles;
(2) Bulk transfer law is generally construed as constructive fraud law,
focusing on creditor prejudice rather than transferor and transferee intent to defraud;
(3) Fraudulent dispositions may be avoided on either a constructive or
actual fraud basis;
(4) Constructive fraud law has developed as an adjunct of the actual
fraud law;
(5) Developments in the fraudulent disposition law have, increasingly,
confirmed the affinity between the bases of actual and constructive
fraud liability;
(6) In the context of conversions of nonexempt property to exempt
property just prior to bankruptcy, the courts infer intent to defraud
scienter requirements are relaxed to avoid the undesirable result of leaving a victim uncompensated
for the loss inflicted by a negligent party.
In making negligent misrepresentations actionable, courts will engage in standard negligence
analysis: I) Was a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff? 2) Was that duty breached? 3) Was plaintiff injured? 4) Was the breach of duty the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury? See Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N .Y. 170, 191, 174 N.E. 441, 449 (1931) (Cardozo, J.) (negligent misrepresentations sustain inference of fraud). In Ultramares, a creditor of a corporation relied to its detriment
on a negligently prepared audit which provided a more hopeful picture of the corporation's finances
than was warranted. /d. at 113-75, 174 N.E. at 442. Imposition of liability for this negligence
proceeded from the duty owed the creditor by the defendant. /d. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. The duty
analysis allows courts to recognize negligent misrepresentations by finding a duty was owed; at the
same time, a court may prevent overbroad imposition of liability by finding no duty in appropriate
cases. Indeed, scholars have argued that the finding of a duty is more a means to a legal conclusion
than a useful analytical device. W. PROSSER,]. WADE & V. ScHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 415-16 (7th ed. 1982).
As a final expansion of liability for misrepresentation, some states impose strict liability with no
scienter requirement. Liability may be imposed for the incidents of an entirely innocent misrepresentation. There is both statutory authority, e.g., ALA. CoDE§ 6-5-101 (misrepresentations of material fact made "by mistake and innocently . . . constitute legal fraud") and case authority, e.g.,
Community Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. Musser (In re Musser), 24 Banke. 913 (W.O. Va.
1982) (assignment ineffective although misrepresentation about purpose of assignment innocent);
Susser Petroleum Co. v. Latina Oil Corp., 574 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (liability imposed
regardless of whether misrepresentation is innocent); Reda v. Sincaban, 145 Wis. 2d 266, 426
N.W.2d 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (strict liability imposed for misrepresentation), recognizing liability for innocent misrepresentations. Venerable authority has suggested, however, that the imposition
of such liability is clearly a minority position. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 25 (1943). The conclusion of the
Virginia Supreme Court concisely formulates the point: "Whether the representation is made innocently or knowingly, if acted on, the effect is the same." B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Benjamin T.
Crump Co., 199 Va. 312, 315, 99 S.E.2d 606, 609 (1957).
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(actual fraud) from circumstances suggesting prejudice to the interests
of the debtor's creditors (constructive fraud); and
(7) Bulk sales cases concerning the effect of noncompliance on the
concealment provision of the section 6-111 statute of limitations obscure the relationship between intent (actual fraud) and prejudice to
creditors (constructive fraud) in Article 6.
These conclusions provide a basis for evaluating transferee liability issues under
current Article 6 and under the proposed revision Alternatives.
II. THE REVISIONS AND THE BLACK HOLE

The Alternatives promulgated by the ALI and NCCUSL respond to contemporary criticisms of Article 6 by reducing the theories of recovery available
to the creditor-victims of a bulk transfer. Alternative A, which would repeal
Article 6 in its entirety, would deny creditors all of the protections currently
afforded them by the bulk sales law. Alternative B, in comparison, would respond to particular issues that have generated debate under the current law.
The drafters of Alternative B have developed a statute that, while arguably providing some creditor protection, would compromise substantially the theories
available to complaining creditors under the present law. By limiting liability of
bulk transferees, the drafters of the Alternatives have created what some may
consider a gap, and what others may perceive is more akin to a black hole.
If aggrieved creditors are unable to recover against transferees to the same
extent as they may now recover under the bulk sales law - that is, if there is in
fact a remedial black hole - it is fair to assume that creditors will seek alternate
ways to respond to the deficiencies. Given the fundamental affinity between
fraudulent disposition and bulk sales law posited in Part I of the essay, it may be
that the UFCA, UFfA, and Bankruptcy Code section 548 could be interposed
to fill the void.

A. The Status Quo and Transferee Liability
One of the more glaring deficiencies in current Article 6 is the statute's
failure to provide specific and substantial protections for creditors of the bulk
transferor. First, a creditor who is duly notified under the statute may be able
only to witness the sale of the assets and may have no legal means to prevent the
sale or assert a claim against the assets transferred in bulk. 113 Second, if the
transactors do not comply with the notice requirements, the form and extent of
the transferee's liability for the ineffective transfer is uncertain. This latter point
is particularly relevant to the present inquiry.
1. Transferee Liability in Optional Section 6-106 States

There are, in fact, two "uniform" versions of current Article 6. The version
enacted in most states contains no provision for the application of bulk sales
proceeds to the claims of the transferor's creditors. A version adopted in a
113. See supra note 12 and accompanying text for a discussion of remedies available to a creditor of a bulk transferor.
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few states, 114 however, expressly creates a duty to apply proceeds to the transferor's outstanding obligations. Optional section 6-106 imposes this duty on the
transferee. 11 5
Optional section 6-106 imposes a duty upon the transferee to apply the consideration payable to the transferor to the claims of creditors appearing on the
section 6-104list as well as section 6-107 creditor claimants. Where the optional
provision is in force, courts have had to determine the consequences of the transferee's failure to comply with the direction of the optional provision. The section does not expressly authorize the imposition of personal liability on the
transferee. Nevertheless, to provide some sanction for the transferee's noncompliance with the application of proceeds requirement, several courts have imposed personalliability.116
In Darby v. Ewing's Home Fumishings, 117 the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma held that a transferee who fails to comply
with optional section 6-106 may be personally liable to the creditors of the transferor for either the value of the property transferred in bulk or for the amount
the transferee paid for the property. 118 A Kentucky court, in Cornelius v. J & R
Motor Supply Corp. 119 reached a similar conclusion regarding personal liability.
In that case, the transferee commingled the property transferred in bulk with
other property. 120 That commingling had precluded the transferor's creditors
from reaching the transferred property. 121 The court held that the creditors
were entitled to impose personal liability on the transferee in an amount equal to
their pro rata share of all creditors' claims existing at the time of the bulk
sale.122
Several bankruptcy courts have also imposed personal liability. The courts
generally have relied on the scope of the trustee's avoiding powers to support
their conclusion. 123 The decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern Dis114. U.C.C. § 6-106, with some variation, has been adopted by Alaska, California, Florida,
Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virgin Islands, Washington, and
West Virginia.
115. See infra Appendix for the text of optional§ 6-106. The UCC provides for the omission of
§§ 6-107(2)(e), 6-108(3)(c), and 6-109(2) whenever optional§ 6-106 is not enacted.
116. See Darby v. Ewing's Home Furnishings, 278 F. Supp. 917 (W.O. Okla. 1967) (failure to
comply with U.C.C. § 6-104 renders transferee liable for value of goods or purchase price); Cornelius
v. J. & R. Motor Supply Corp., 468 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971) (buyer who commingled goods
acquired in violation of bulk sales law personally liable); Mid-America Indus., Inc. v. Retchie, 767
P.2d 416 (Okla. 1989) (failure to comply with notice provisions of bulk sales law gives rise to personal lialbility).
117. 278 F. Supp. 917 (W.O. Okla. 1967).
118. /d. at 919.
119. 468 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
120. /d. at 782.
121. /d. at 783. The court noted that a transferee could be held personally liable if he or she
undermined the creditor's right to reach the goods by disposing of or converting the property for his
or her own use. /d.
122. /d. at 784.
123. See. e.g., Bakst v. Vono (In re Gold Rush East, Inc.), 55 Banke. 126 (Banke. S.D. Fla.
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trict of Florida in Babkst v. Nono (In re Gold Rush East, Inc.) 124 is particularly
interesting. The court did not rely on optional section 6-106 notwithstanding
the fact that it was the governing law in that jurisdiction. Instead, the court
found that the transfer violated section 6-104. The court then held that the
trustee could rely upon that violation to avoid the transfer pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 544(b). 125 Sbar's, Inc. v. New Jersey Art &: Craft Distributors, Inc., 126 a similarly provocative decision, also involved a jurisdiction that
has adopted optional section 6-106. 127 In Sbar's, the New Jersey Superior Court
found a section 6-104 violation and relied on that section, rather than on section
6-106, to impose personal liability on the bulk transferee.l 28
In states adopting optional section 6-106, courts will recognize a transferee
duty to apply the bulk sale proceeds to the claims of a transferor's creditors as
one basis for imposing personal liability on the transferee. From the Gold Rush
and Sbar's decisions, however, it would seem that even where optional section 6106 is in force courts may be willing to impose personal liability on the basis of a
violation of the section 6-104 notice requirements. Accepting section 6-104 as
an independent source of liability may be sufficient to support the imposition of
personal liability even in states that have not adopted optional section 6-106.
Although other cases affirm that conclusion, a sense of uncertainty about personal liability generally persists under the current law.
2. Transferee Liability in States That Have Not Adopted Optional
Section 6-106
Insofar as optional section 6-106 recognizes a transferee's duty to protect
the interests of the transferor's creditors, it arguably provides a basis from which
to formulate the consequences of the transferee's breach of that duty, including
the imposition of personal liability. The states that have not enacted optional
section 6-106, however, differ on the issue of transferees' personal liability. Even
among courts within the same jurisdiction there is disagreement. Decisions in
those states can be placed in three categories: no personal liability of transferee;
possible personal liability of transferee; and personal liability of transferee.
a. No Transferee Liability
In American Express Co. v. Bomar Shoe Co. 129 and Get It Kwik ofAmerica,
Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 130 the courts held that an in personam action
1985) (trustee may avoid transfer and recover from transferee where transfer voidable under state
law); Stolba v. Mastandrea (In re Pritchard), 8 Banke. 688 (Banke. C.D. Cal. 1981) (trustee may
avoid transfer and recover from transferee where transferee fails to comply with state bulk sales law).
124. 55 Bankr. 126 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
125. /d. at 127.
126. 205 N .J. Super. 516, 501 A.2d 560 (1985).
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:6-106 {West 1962 & Supp. 1990).
128. 205 N.J. Super. at 518, 501 A.2d at 561 (purchaser may be ordered to satisfy debt owed by
debtor to plaintiff only to extent of fair value of goods transferred).
129. 125 Ga. App. 408, 187 S.E.2d 922 (1972).
130. 361 So. 2d 568 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).
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against the transferee was not available to a creditor who had not received the
statutorily mandated notice. 131 The courts relied on the fact that the states providing the governing law (Georgia and Alabama, respectively) had not enacted
optional section 6-106; these legislative decisions were deemed probative of the
transferee liability issue. 132
b. Possible Transferee Liability

The Bomar Shoe and Get It Kwik decisions were rendered by intermediate
appellate courts. 133 More recent decisions by the supreme courts of those same
states have left unresolved the question of the transferee's personal liability. In
McKesson Robbins v. Bruno's, Inc., 134 the Alabama Supreme Court recognized
that a transferee could be personally liable to the transferor's creditors. 135 Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Vincent Brass & Aluminum
Co. 136 and Boss v. Bassett Furniture Industries, 137 intimated that Article 6
presented no .impediment to the imposition of personal liability.l 38 The Boss
court reasoned that supplementary principles of law and equity incorporated
into the Code by operation of section 1-103 would provide the source of transferee personal liability.t39
In New York, there is also inconsistent treatment of the transferee personal
liability issue. The New York courts seem to weigh the level of culpability of the
transferee in resolving the issue. In Satenspiels Markets, Inc. v. Hing Lung Chinese Restaurant, Inc., 140 the court found that a transferee would not be personally liable to a creditor where the transferee had no knowledge of the claim of
the creditor who had not received notice. 141 A similar focus on the transferee's
culpability was also evident in HLC Imports Corp. v. M & L Siegel, Inc., 142 an
earlier New York case. The HLC court suggested that, though the complaining
creditor had no basis under Article 6 to impose personal liability on the transferee, the creditor might be able to bring a tort action against the transferee. 143
131. Bomar Shoe, 125 Ga. App. at 410, 187 S.E.2d at 924; Get it Kwik, 361 So. 2d at 571-72.
Cf New Haven Tobacco v. O'Brien, 37 Conn. Supp. 815, 818, 438 A.2d 440, 442 (1981) (notes
exception to rule in cases in which transferee misappropriated or commingled assets) (citing Cornelius v. J. & R. Motor Supply Corp., 468 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971)).
132. 125 Ga. App. at 410, 187 S.E.2d at 924; 361 So. 2d at 571.
133. 125 Ga. App. at 408, 187 S.E.2d at 922; 361 So. 2d at 568.
134. 368 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1979).
135. /d. at 2.
136. 244 Ga. 412, 260 S.E.2d 325 (1979).
137. 249 Ga. 166, 288 S.E.2d 559 (1982).
138. Johnson, 244 Ga. at 414, 260 S.E.2d at 326; Boss, 249 Ga. at 169, 288 S.E.2d at 562.
139. 249 Ga. at 169, 288 S.E.2d at 562. (nothing in UCC indicates [creditor] may not proceed
on any common law or equitable grounds against transferee, notwithstanding bulk transfer law).
140. 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1370 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
141. Id. at 1372.
142. 98 Misc. 2d 179, 413 N.Y.S.2d 605 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979).
143. /d. at 180,413 N.Y.S.2d at 606 (citing Jacobs v. Tannenbaum, 249 A.D. 847, 292 N .Y.S.
735 (1937); Gabbe v. Kleban Drug Corp., 6 Misc. 2d 457, 161 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1957) (insurance
broker granted judgment against buyer of business on alleged agreement by buyer to assume liability
for insurance premiums)). The HLC court stated that the New York City civil court's jurisdiction
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c. Definite Transferee Liability
Clearly most troubling to the drafters of the proposed Alternatives is the
substantial body of cases that have categorically imposed personal liability on
the transferee in states not adopting optional section 6-106} 44 Courts in at least
five states have construed the bulk sales law to support the imposition of personal liability on a bulk transferee. In these cases, the courts have not deemed
transferee scienter dispositive.
The bankruptcy court sitting in the Southern District of New York construed the New York bulk sales law in In re Curtina International, Inc. 145 In
that case, the court found that the transferee would be personally liable under
Article 6 to the creditors of the transferor "for the value of the merchandise
transferred." 146 The Curtina opinion supports a formulation of the state's law
that sanctions in personam recovery against the transferee, not just for an
amount equal to the value paid by the transferee, but for the fair market value of
the assets transferred in bulk.I47
In John Boyle & Co. v. Colorado Patio & Awning Co., 148 the Colorado Court
of Appeals referred to pre-U.C.C. bulk sales law in the state to support the imposition of personal liability on the bulk transferee. 149 The Boyle court imposed
on the transferee the additional burden of establishing that the value of the property transferred in bulk was less than the value of the complaining creditor's
claim. 150 Most provocative is the court's suggestion that the transferee breached
a fiduciary duty to the creditors of the transferor. 151 In Boyle, the transferee was
the president and sole stockholder of the transferor corporation. He was aware
of both the transferor's financial condition and the complaining creditor's claim
was limited to the exceptional case involving tortious conduct or breach of contract. /d. General
equity jurisdiction of actions for recision or reformation due to Article 6 violations was granted to
the city civil courts by statute in 1980. N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act § 213 (1989).
144. See, e.g., Ross v. Randolph (In re Villa Roel, Inc.), 57 Bankr. 835, 839 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1985) (bulk transferee liability measured by value of assets on date of transfer); Murdock v. Plymouth Enters., Inc. (In re Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 969,979 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noncompliance with bulk sales law rendered transferee accountable to creditors of transferor); John Boyle &
Co. v. Colorado Patio & Awning Co., 654 P.2d 335, 336 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (corporate director
liable to creditor for improper notice of transfer of assets); Vincent Brass & Alumnium Co. v. Johnson, 149 Ga. App. 537, 538, 254 S.E.2d 752, 754 (garnishment action against transferee in rem
proceeding), rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 412, 260 S.E.2d 325 (1979); Starman v. John E. Wolfe,
Inc., 490 S.W.2d 377, 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (transferee in bulk sale liable to creditor of transferor
upon failure to give proper notice).
145. Murdock v. Plymouth Enters., Inc. (In re Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23 Bank.r. 969 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1982).
146. Id. at 979.
147. /d. at 980.
148. 654 P.2d 335 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
149. ld. at 336. The court emphasized not only the transactors' failure to comply with Article
6, but also that the transferee had breached a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff-creditor. /d.
150. Id. (defendant-transferee would be liable because did not demonstrate value of property
transferred was less than debt owing plaintift).
151. /d.
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against the transferor.l 52 Admittedly, the relationship between the transferor
and transferee in Boyle was somewhat atypical. Nonetheless, it is conceivable
that in other bulk sales contexts there might be a sufficiently close relationship
between a transferor and transferee to support the imposition of transferee liability based on a breach of fiduciary duty. 153 The scope of that type of theory is
not certain. The possibility, however, further demonstrates the impact of relaxed scienter requirements in the constructive fraud law. 154
The personal liability law in Georgia is also not a paradigm of clarity.
While the state courts and bankruptcy courts formulating the state law have
stopped short of sanctioning personal liability of a bulk transferee, they have
recognized the availability of a garnishment action to reach the proceeds realized by the transferee upon a subsequent disposition of the property transferred
in bulk. 155 The Georgia Court of Appeals, in Vincent Brass & Aluminum Co. v.
Johnson, 156 characterized the garnishment action against the transferee as an in
rem rather than in personam proceeding. 157 Certainly, from the perspective of
the transferee, the distinction is one of form rather than substance.
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in Starman v. John E. Wolfe, Inc. , 158 also
recognized the viability of a garnishment action against the bulk transferee. The
court determined that the transferee would be liable for either the amount paid
152. Id.
153. For cases finding constructive fraud for innocent misrepresentations based on the relationship of the parties, see, e.g., Crawford Painting & Drywall Co. v. J.W. Bateson Co., 857 F.2d 981
(5th Cir. 1988) (contractor/subcontractor), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 850 (1989); Zimpel v. Trawick,
679 F. Supp. 1502 (W.O. Ark. 1988) (vendor/vendee); Chandler v. Chandler, 514 So. 2d 1307 (Ala.
1987) (parent/child); Barrett v. Bank of Am., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986)
(bank/depositor). See generally P. ALCES, supra note 11,11 2.02(4), at 2-24 to 2-26 (citing Zeilenga v.
Stelle Indus., Inc., 52 Ill. App. 3d 753, 757, 367 N.E.2d 1347, 1349-50 (1977) (factors to be considered in determining existence of confidential relationship include kinship, difference in age, plaintiff's
health, plaintiff's mental condition, plaintiff's previous reliance on defendant), id., ~ 7.02[I][d), at 713 to 7-17 (discusses cases where fiduciary liability found between lenders and borrowers).
154. See Alces, Generic Fraud and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 9 CARDOZO L. REv.
743 (1987) (discusses potential impact of relaxed scienter requirements on fraud calculus in certain
leveraged business acquisition cases). Cf Crowley v. Green, 148 Colo. 142, 148, 365 P.2d 230, 233
(1961) (quoting Fishel v. Goddard, 30 Colo. 147, 154, 69 P. 607, 609 (1902)). In Crowley, the court
noted that
[T]he relationship of a director of a corporation to the legal entity which he represents
is fiduciary, and the law treats him as a trustee in this respect. . . . A purchase by him of
corporate assets may not be void ab initio as to creditors, but he will not be permitted to
reap a benefit to their detriment by dealing in them as a third party, because the law inhibits a trustee from speculating in the subject matter of his trust. Hence, it follows, that if he
does purchase corporate assets he must account to those who have the right to demand it
for the full value of the property so purchased.
155. American Express Co. v. Bomar Shoe Co., 125 Ga. App. 408, 410, 187 S.E.2d 922, 924
(1972) (creditor of defendant has remedy of garnishment) (citing Jaques & Tinsley Co. v. Carstarphen Whse. Co., 131 Ga. 1, 2, 62 S.E. 82, 82 (1908)).
156. 149 Ga. App. 537, 254 S.E.2d 752, rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 412, 260 S.E.2d 325
(1979).
157. Id. at 538, 254 S.E.2d at 754.
158. 490 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
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to the transferor for the assets or the value of the assets. 159 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in In re Villa Roe/,
Inc.,tro upheld the personal liability of a bulk transferee to the complaining
creditor for the value of the assets transferred in bulk. As to the measure of that
personal liability, the court reasoned that the value paid by the transferee for the
assets would be used to determine the value of the assets transferred.l 61
Consequently, while not all states have addressed the issue, a substantial
number of the courts that have considered transferee liability have identified
some theory to support the imposition of personal liability. As an alternative to
finding liability under section 6-106, the courts most often rely on the section 6104 obligation imposed on the parties to a bulk transfer to notify the creditors of
the transferor. 162 Some decisions suggest that a court may consider or even
assume the transferee's scienter or close relationship with the transferor. 16 3 Additionally, bankruptcy courts, reviewing the trustee's right to proceed against
the bulk transferee, have found a bankruptcy interest supporting the imposition
of personal liability. It is in bankruptcy, however, that the consequences of personal liability may prove most problematic from the perspective of transferees.
3. Personal Liability of the Bulk Transferee upon Bankruptcy: Impact of
Moore v. Boy
The rule of the case of Moore v. Boy 164 operates with section 544(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code to afford the trustee greater recovery in bankruptcy than
would be available to creditors of the transferor under state law. 165 Under
Moore, a trustee can avoid a debtor's disposition of property so long as the
trustee can identify an actual creditor who has standing to avoid the transfer.
That avoidance is not limited to the amount of that particular creditor's claim;
rather, it extends to the value of the entire transfer. For example, suppose a
creditor with standing to attack a bulk transfer had a claim against the debtortransferor in the amount of $1000 and the debtor had transferred $1,000,000 in
assets to the transferee. The debtor's trustee in bankruptcy could invalidate the
entire bulk sale, recovering the entire $1,000,000 in assets from the transferee,
leaving the transferee with an unsecured claim against the property of the bank159. /d. at 385.
160. Ross v. Randolph (In re Villa Roel, Inc.), 57 Bankr. 835 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985).
161. Id. at 839 (damages determined by value of items transferred on date of transfer and not
reduced by posttransfer expenditures transferee may have made).
162. See Bakst v. Vono (In re Gold Rush East, Inc.), 55 Bankr. 126 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985)
(transfer voidable under state law; trustee may avoid transfer and recover from transferee); Sbar's,
Inc. v. New Jersey Art & Craft Distribs., Inc., 205 N.J. Super. 516, 501 A.2d 560 (1985) (creditor
may seek personal liability against purchaser for value of goods where sale ineffective under state
law).
163. See. e.g., Jacobs v. Tannenbaum, 249 A.D. 847, 848, 292 N.Y.S. 735, 737 (1937) (transferee personal liability based on nature of business and time lapse between transfer and entry of
judgment).
164. 284 u.s. 4 (1931).
165. Id. at 5.
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ruptcy estate. 166
Section 544(b) operates to subrogate the trustee to the claim of an existing
creditor of the debtor with standing to attack the debtor's disposition of property. Under general subrogation law, the trustee's claim should be determined
by and be limited to the claim of the creditor to which the trustee is subrogated.167 By permitting the trustee to avoid the entire transfer, without limitation to the claim of the existing creditor, the rule of Moore v. Bay departs from
subrogation law in a manner not necessarily supported by the policy interests
underlying the bankruptcy law. The rule of Moore v. Bay, therefore, has been
extensively criticized as inconsistent with basic subrogation principles and fundamental bankruptcy policies. 168
Dean Jackson has asserted that the Moore v. Bay gloss on section 544(b)
frustrates the temperamental fit between state law and the federal bankruptcy
law:
[S]ection 544(b) creates incentives for individual creditors to resort to
bankruptcy not for collective reasons but to achieve individual advantage. The costs imposed by such incentives do not even proceed from a
careful consideration of the inequities of the nonbankruptcy rule; to
the contrary, the commentary gives no indication that any given
nonbankruptcy property law is particularly unwise. 169
In a later article, Dean Jackson and Professor Scott recognized that the Moore v.
Bay rule "reinforces·the deterrent effects of the trustee's avoidance powers." 170
166. See Dunham, Post-Petition Transfers in Bankruptcy, 39 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 113 n.490
(1984) {courts construing Moore have held trustee's avoidance power is not limited by claim of
creditor in position to avoid transfer; where creditor can avoid transaction, entire transfer is set
aside; Congress intended to implement doctrine of Moore) (discussing Murdock v. Plymouth Enters., Inc. (In re Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 969, 981 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (entire bulk sales
transfer set aside)). See also Jackson, supra note 34, at 742 (under Moore, trustee may avoid entire
interests that subrogated creditor could have avoided only to amount of claim) (citing In re Plonta,
311 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1962); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kahn, 203 F .2d 449 (8th Cir. 1953); City of
New York v. Rassner, 127 F .2d 703 {2d Cir. 1942)).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 242, (1947) (subrogee replaces
one whose claim has been paid); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co., 117 U.S. 312, 321
(1886) (insurer's rights of subrogation limited to rights of insured). See generally 73 AM. JuR. 2d
Subrogation § 106 (1974 & Supp. 1990); 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 14 (1953 & Supp. 1990).
168. See J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON BANKRUPTCY 331 (1956) (Moore
court did not grasp point of case and did not understand effect of its decision); Jackson & Scott, On
the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors' Bargain, 15 VA. L.
REV. 155, 183 (1989) (effect of Moore is to redistribute assets beyond requirement of collectivization,
thus exacerbating perverse incentive problems); Jackson, supra note 34, at 744-48 (Moore involved
two issues: 1) extent to which trustee may avoid transfer; and 2) beneficiaries of avoidance; court
resolved both issues wrongly); Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1419, 1422 (1967) (Moore has survived despite attacks on its logic and equity). But see 2 G. GLENN, supra note 28, § 505, at 867 (Moore correct, else
present Bankruptcy Act would have legislated ruling out of existence). See also Schwartz, Moore v.
Bay-Should Its Rule Be Abolished?, 29 REF. J. 67 (1955); Comment, The Trustee in Bankruptcy
and the Secured Creditor, 17 ARK. L. REV. 46, 56 ( 1962) (Moore commonly attacked improperly by
combining consideration of extent of recovery and identification of beneficiary).
169. Jackson, supra note 34, at 750.
170. Jackson & Scott, supra note 168, at 181.
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Even acknowledging the validity of the creditor misbehavior deterrent argument, however, the authors are concerned about its only being applied in the
bankruptcy setting. 171 They argue that the danger of forum shopping exists so
long as creditor remedies differ in state and federal fora. 172
At the state level, Article 6 provides that a bulk transfer not in compliance
with the specified notice requirements is "ineffective., 173 Bankruptcy Code section 544(b), as federal law, provides that the trustee may set aside any transfer
by the deptor that is "voidable, under state law. 174 The terminology of the state
and federal law is not parallel. Nevertheless, the courts that have confronted the
interrelation of Article 6 and section 544 have determined that the trustee may
use the Moore v. Bay interpretation of section 544(b) to recover assets from a
transferee who acquired them in a noncomplying bulk sale.1 75 For example, in
In re Wicaco Machine Co., Inc., 176 the court found that once the trustee has
established the elements of an Article 6 action, the trustee may recover either
property transferred in bulk or the value of the property under section 544. 177
Bankruptcy courts have been willing to identify bases of liablity aside from
section 544. In In re Radcliffe's Warehouse Sales, Inc., 178 the Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Washington considered an action by the trustee to
avoid a debtor,s transfer of assets as both a noncomplying bulk sale and a constructively fraudulent transfer under section 548 of the Code. 179 The court
noted that the trustee,s section 544(b) bulk sales action was derivative, dependent on there being a creditor of the debtor-transferor with standing to avoid the
bulk sale. 180 Insofar as the action was not commenced within six months of the
bulk sale, the court concluded that there remained an open factual question:
whether the bulk sale had been concealed so as to toll the running of the limitations period under section 6-111 of Article 6. 181 The court also noted that a
coincident fraudulent transfer action would lie if the trustee could establish that
the debtor-transferor had received less than a reasonably equivalent value for the
171. Id. at 184.
172. Id.
173. U.C.C. § 6-105. See also supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
meaning of "ineffective."
174. 11 u.s.c. § 544 (1988).
175. See, e.g., Danning v. Daylin, Inc., 488 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1973)(section 70(e), predecessor
of§ 544(b), applied); Ganz v. Kovatch (In re Wicaco Mach. Co.), 55 Bankr. 588 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985) (Article 6 and § 544(b) applied), appeal denied, 60 Bankr. 415 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Stolba v.
Mastrandrea (In re Pritchard), 8 Bankr. 688 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981) (section 70(e) applied).
176. 55 Bankr. 588 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
177. Id. at 592.
178. McCoy v. Grinnell (In re Radcliffe's Whse. Sales, Inc.), 31 Bankr. 827 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1983).
179. Id. at 828.
180. Id. at 832. This point was critical to whether the trustee would be restricted to the state
statute of limitations or would be able to utilize the more generous federal statute of limitations in
Bankruptcy Code § 108. /d. at 830-32.
181. I d. at 832. If there is concealment, the state statute of limitations (U.C.C. § 6-111) would
be tolled until discovery of the transfer. Id. at 831.
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assets. 182 Because that determination contemplates a factual review, the court
deemed summary judgment on the fraudulent transfer issue inappropriate. 183
Still, the case illustrates the potential for a trustee's prosecution of both a section
544(b) bulk sales action and a section 548 fraudulent transfer action on the same
facts. 184
The bankruptcy court in In re Sergio, Inc. 185 also links Article 6 and fraud
bases of recovery. In that case, there was a series of property transfers among
the owners of a closely held enterprise and its principals as well as between the
enterprise and its creditors. The court found a sufficient basis to support both a
bulk transfer action under Article 6 and an action premised on the debtor's actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud its creditors. 186 The court found that
each of the badges of fraud as defined by Hawaii case law was in evidence. 187
Further, the court determined that since the bulk transferees knew of the financial condition and design of the transferor, the violation of Article 6 also established an actual intent to defraud action. 188
While every bulk sale may not evidence an actual intent to defraud, there is
sufficient coincidence between the two theories to present the possibility in bulk
sales litigation that a constructive fraud action would lie as wel1. 189 That affinity
should be considered when evaluating the impact of the Alternatives on the relationship between the bulk sales and fraudulent disposition law, particularly in
182. /d. at 829.
183. /d.
184. /d. at 832. For other cases in which the same potential for that affinity existed, see. e.g.,
Best Mfg., Inc. v. White Plains Coat & Apron Co. (In re Danielle Laundries, Inc.), 40 Bankr. 404,
408-10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (trustee brought action based on fraudulent conveyance and state
bulk sales law); Limperis v. Kolacny (In re Chicago Music Corp.), 36 Bankr. 626, 632 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1984) (trustee allowed to collect property fraudulently transferred in bulk).
185. Nakagawa v. Sergio, Inc. (In re Sergio, Inc.), 16 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. D . Haw. 1981).
186. Id. at 910.
187. /d. at 908. The court listed the badges of fraud:
a. The transferor is indebted or insolvent;
b. The conveyance is general, i.e., that the debtor's entire estate is diminished, thereby
leaving him insolvent;
c. Consideration for the conveyance is absent;
d. The conveyance is secret and concealed;
e. The conveyance is made to a family member or to one of close relationship;
f. The conveyance is made while a suit against the debtor is pending or is threatening;
g. The transferee takes the property in trust for the debtor;
h. The debtor remains in possession, reserves the use and benefit, and deals with the
property as his own.
/d.
188. /d. at 909. See also McCoy v. Grinnell (/n re Radcliffe's Whse. Sales, Inc.), 31 Bankr. 827,
832 (Bankr. W.O. Wash. 1983) (court willing to impose greater liability if transferee acted to conceal
transaction). For examples of cases holding the transferee personally liable to the transferor's creditor, see supra notes 144-63 and accompanying text.
189. Given the problematic nature of valuation analyses in the fraudulent disposition law and
the impact of valuations on the constructive fraud calculus, it may be that post hoc value determinations would result in the avoidance of certain bulk sales on a constructive fraud basis. See Alces &
Dorr, supra note 44, at 557-63.
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light of the impact of Moore v. Bay.l 90
B. Repeal or Revision of Article 6

Prominent among the shortcomings of existing Article 6 identified by the
drafters of the proposed alternatives is the current law's treatment of transferee
liability issues. Specifically, the drafters of the revision have responded to the
concern that bulk transfer liability may be imposed in a manner and to an extent
wholly out of proportion to the evil accomplished by a noncomplying bulk sale.
Not convinced that the evil addressed by the bulk sales law remains a contemporary commercial problem, the drafters seem convinced that the bulk sales law
may have outlived its ratio decidendi. 191
That conclusion was the basis of both the repeal and the revision alternatives. The NCCUSL concluded that there remains no good commercial reason
for bulk sales liability; they recommend Alternative A, the repealer. 192 Since all
states may not agree with the NCCUSL, the drafters also proposed an Alternative B ("Revision"). The Revision adjusts the calculus to impose bulk sales
liability on transferees in fewer contexts than under current law. Further, it
contemplates a more limited liability. 193
Revised section 6-107 addresses the scope of transferee liability to both
claimants and creditors. All claimants are creditors but not all creditors are
claimants. 194 The Revision defines a transferee-buyer's duty to apply the pro190. 284 u.s. 4 (1931).
191. See Revised U.C.C. Article 6, Prefatory Note, Background.
In the legal context in which Article 6 (1987 Official Text) and its nonuniform predecessors
were enacted, the benefits to creditors appeared to justify the costs of interfering with good
faith transactions.
(T]here is no evidence that, in today's economy, fraudulent bulk sales are frequent enough,
or engender credit losses significant enough, to require regulation of all bulk sales, includ·
ing the vast majority that are conducted in good faith.
/d.

192. See Revised U.C.C. Article 6, Prefatory Note, Recommendation.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American
Law Institute believe that changes in the business and legal contexts in which sales are
conducted have made regulation of bulk sales unnecessary. The Conference and the Institute therefore withdraw their support for Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code and
encourage those states that have enacted the Article to repeal it.
/d.

193. Revised U.C.C. § 6-107. See infra Appendix for a portion of the text of Revised U.C.C.
§ 6-107.
194. See Revised U.C.C. § 6-102(f) (1989) (creditor defined as claimant or other person holding claim). Claimant is defined as:
[A] person holding a claim incurred in the seller's business other than:
(i) an unsecured and unmatured claim for employment compensation and benefits, including commissions and vacation, severance and sick-leave pay;
(ii) a claim for injury to an individual or to property, or for breach of warranty,
unless:
(A) a right of action for the claim has accrued
(B) the claim has been asserted against seller, and
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ceeds of the bulk sale according to a "schedule of distribution.'' 195 If the buyer
fails to make the proper distribution to a creditor, the buyer will be liable to the
creditor for the amount of the creditor's claim, less any amount that the creditor
would not have realized even if the buyer had complied with the schedule of
distribution. 196 The buyer will also be liable to all claimants (but not necessarily
all creditors) for the buyer's failure to comply with any of the other requirements of section 6-104, such as the notice requirements.l 97 Again, the buyer's
liability would be reduced by the amount that the claimant could not have recovered even had the buyer complied with the section 6-104 requirements.l 98
Those liability rules are subject to two substantial limitations. First, the
buyer who has acted in good faith will not be liable for any violation of the
section 6-104 requirements.l 99 Second, even the buyer who has not acted in
good faith will be liable only on an in personam basis. That is, the liability cannot exceed twice the net contract price paid by the buyer, less the amount of any
proceeds already paid to or for the benefit of the seller. 200 Subsection 6-107(8)
reflects the drafters' intent to clarify the in personam (rather than in rem) nature
of any cause of action against the buyer who has in bad faith failed to comply
with the requirements of section 6-104.
The revised section reads in pertinent part:
(8) A buyer's failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6104(1) does not (i) impair the buyer's rights in or title to the assets,
(ii) render the sale ineffective, void, or voidable, (iii) entitle a creditor
to more than a single satisfaction of his [or her] claim, or (iv) create
liability other than as provided in this Article. 201
The Revision substantially compromises the rights of a complaining creditor or trustee in bankruptcy to upset a bulk sale. Even if the creditor or trustee
prevailed in a Revised Article 6 action, it is likely that the extent of the recovery
would be limited. As a result, a creditor might tum to other commercial fraud
theories to accomplish the type of recovery available under current Article 6. If
that strategy is successful, trustees may recover even more than under the current bulk sales law. Consequently, the object of those who sought the promulga(C) the seller knows the identity of the person asserting the claim and the
basis upon which the person has asserted it.
/d. § 6-l02(e). Cf id. § 6-102(d) (claim defined as "right to payment . . . whether or not ... reduced
to judgment, liquidated, fixed, matured, disputed, secured, legal, or equitable" ). Given this broad
definition, the language in the definition of creditor, "or other person holding a claim," may include
those persons excluded from the definition of claimants under the "other than" provisions.
195. Revised U.C.C. § 6-106 (1989).
196. /d. § 6-l07(l)(a).
197. /d. § 6-107(1)(b).
198. See id. § 6-1 07(2) (creditor has burden of establishing validity and amount of claim while
buyer must establish amount creditor would not have realized if buyer had complied).
199. /d. § 6-107(3).
200. /d. § 6-107(4).
201. /d.§ 6-107(8). See also id. § 6-107 comment 2 (asserts that change in available remedy for
creditor, from avoidance of sale to recovery of damages, precludes bankruptcy trustee's avoidance of
sale under Bankruptcy Code § 544(b)).
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tion of Revised Article 6, avoidance (or invalidation) of Moore v. Bay, 202 may be
frustrated. Moreover, if the trustee is better off using a commercial fraud theory
other than that the trustee would be prosecuting under the current law, the
drafters' efforts may in fact prove to have backfired.
1. The Worst of Times
In the course of the last decade or so, commercial transactors have witnessed the proliferation of commercial fraud theories. The scienter requirement
has been relaxed as more and more courts seem willing to find actionable negligent and even innocent misrepresentations.203 Plaintiff-debtors have utilized a
breach of fiduciary duty theory to recover substantial damages from creditors
deemed to have taken unfair advantage. 204 These more aggressive and successful fraud actions against lenders may stem from the same commercial forces that
have accommodated the expanded application of the fraudulent disposition law
to contexts not originally contemplated by the drafters of the Statute of 13
Elizabeth. 205
As the scope of commercial fraud actions expands, the relations among various fraud theories have become manifest. It is now clear that expansion of one
offensive fraud theory will affect the construction of complementary theories. It
is also clear that, presented with plausible arguments, the courts, particularly
bankruptcy courts, will not hesitate to test the limits of an existing theory to
redress a perceived inequity. From the perspective of those defending against
expansive fraud theories, these may indeed be the worst of times. 206
202. 284 u.s. 4 (1931).
203. For cases utilizing a negligent fraud theory, see, e.g., Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of Am.,
Inc., 611 F.2d 105, 106 (5th Cir. 1980) (corporation liable for agent's negligent misrepresentations);
Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Nemours Found., 606 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (D. Del. 1985) (subcontractor reliance on project owner's knowledge is basis for negligent misrepresentation); Harbor Mechanical,
Inc. v. Arizona Elec., 496 F . Supp. 681, 685 (D. Ariz. 1980) (contractor alleged negligent performance not actionable absent contractor duty). For cases utilizing an innocent misrepresentation theory, see, e.g., Community Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. Musser (In re Musser}, 24 Bankr. 913,
922 (W.O. Va. 1982) (innocent misrepresentation of nature of documents rendered assignment invalid); Susser Petroleum Co. v. Latina Oil Corp., 574 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (false
business advice actionable even if made innocently).
204. See, e.g. , Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923, 926 (Fla. 1986) (bank's fiduciary relationship gave rise to duty to disclose); Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 540, 515 A.2d 756,
765 (1986) (bank owed duty of reasonable care because agreed to process loan application); Deist v.
Wachholz, 208 Mont. 207, 210, 678 P.2d 188, 193 (1984) (special relationship between bank and
loan customer gave rise to bank's fiduciary duty).
205. SeeP. ALCES, supra note 11, ~ 5.02[4] (discusses application of fraudulent disposition law
to leveraged buyouts, intercorporate guaranties, and foreclosure of collateral interests) (citing United
States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987);
Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981); Durrett v. Washington
Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980)).
206. A. CAPPELLO & F. KOMOROSKE, LENDER LIABILITY (1988); J. NORTON & W. BAGGETT, LENDER LIABILITY LAW AND LITIGATION§§ 501-04, (1989); Chaitman, Emerging Theories
of Lender Liability (ABA 1985-1987).
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a. United States v. Tabor Court Rea/ty 201
Leveraged business acquisitions have recently been the subject of fraudulent
disposition attack. 208 The cases generally focus on the constructive fraud incidents of such transactions. But one decision, Tabor Court Realty, is particularly
noteworthy. In that case, the court, recognizing the parallels between actual
intent to defraud and constructive fraud, found that certain leveraged business·
acquisitions would be avoidable on either basis. 209 That finding is significant for
the bulk sales calculus.
In Tabor Court Realty, the target was a closely held corporation. The principals sought to cash out their interests when the firm began to experience financial difficulties. The buyer obtained acquisition financing from Institutional
Investors Trust (IIn, which required that the assets of the target be used to
secure repayment of the financing.210 The court found that liT was in a position
to recognize the impact that the financial arrangement would have on the creditors of the target. Accordingly, the court held that the leveraged buy-out (LBO)
was voidable as a constructively fraudulent conveyance under the Pennsylvania
UFCA. 211 The court further concluded that the lender's awareness of the consequences of the transaction on the interests of the target's creditors was sufficient to establish an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors of the
target. 212 It was the defendant's awareness of the prejudicial impact of the LBO
on the target's creditors that supported the actual intent to defraud action. It
seems that a bulk transferee would be in the same position to appreciate the
207. 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
208. See United States v. G1eneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 576 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (new
management is not fair consideration for corporate stock transfer), aff'd sub nom., United States v.
Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488, 500 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (LBOs are not exempt from
fraudulent conveyance laws); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. (In re
Ohio Corrugating Co.), 70 Bankr. 920 (Bankr. N.D . Ohio 1988) (LBOs are not immune from fraudulent conveyance attack); Roxbury State Bank v. The Clarendon, 129 N.J. Super. 358, 324 A.2d 24
(fraudulent conveyance where no fair consideration exchanged for grantor's encumbrance of assets
to facilitate buyout), cert. denied, 66 N.J. 316, 331 A.2d 16 (1974); Sharrer v. Sandlas, 103 A.D.2d
873, 477 N.Y.S.2d 897 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (fraudulent conveyance when target of LBO receives
no consideration and left with unreasonably small assets), appeal denied, 63 N.Y.2d 610, 473 N.E.2d
1190, 484 N .Y.S.2d 1024 (1984). See also Hansen v. Cramer, 39 Cal. App. 2d 321, - , 245 P.2d
1059, 1060-61 (1952) (because benefit of conveyance inured to third party {discharge of debt) and
not grantor, not for fair consideration; grantor rendered insolvent, therefore transfer void).
But see Jones v. National City Bank (In re Greenbrook Carpet Co.), 722 F.2d 659 (ll th Cir.
1984) (bank's collateral interest from LBO not avoidable as fraudulent transaction); Credit Managers Ass'n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (questionable whether LBOs subject to
fraudulent conveyance attack); Cate v. Nicely (/n re Knox Kreations, Inc.), 474 F. Supp. 567 (E.D.
Tenn. 1979) (LBO not fraudulent conveyance because target not then insolvent, nor rendered insolvent thereby), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 656 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1981).
209. 803 F.2d at 1304-05 & n.9.
210. /d. at 1292.
211. /d. at 1304-05. The Pennsylvania UFCA is codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 351-63
(Purdon 1954 & Supp. 1990).
212. 803 F.2d at 1296, 1304-05.
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consequences of the bulk sale on the transferor's creditors. 213
The Tabor court's conclusion concerning the good faith element of "fair
consideration" under the UFCA is particularly instructive in light of the Revised Article 6 absolute protection of good faith transferees. The very same facts
that supported the actual intent to defraud action in Tabor Court Realty also
supported the finding that the transferee had not given a fair equivalent in good
faith. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confirmed that
the transferee had not given the consideration in good faith
because it knew, or should have known, that the money it lent the
mortgagors was used, in part, to finance the purchase of stock from the
mortgagors' shareholders, and that as a consequence of the loan, liT
and its assignees obtained a secured position in the mortgagors' property to the detriment of creditors. 214
Good faith may have the same meaning in the UFCA as it does in the revision of
Article 6. 215 If that is so, the Tabor Court Realty decision provides the predicate
to support a finding that in many cases the buyer will be exposed to bulk sale
liability under the Revision or actual intent to defraud liability under the uniform fraudulent disposition law or Bankruptcy Code section 548. 216
b. Kidder Skis International v. Williams 211

Preferential transfers are voidable in bankruptcy 218 at the instance of the
trustee. 219 There is, however, a short limitations period that constrains which
213. Cf. supra note 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of transferee's liability despite
lack of knowledge.
214. 803 F.2d at 1295.
215. Revised U.C.C. § 6-102(2)(c) adopts the definition of good faith in U.C.C. § 1-201(19)
(1989) comment. The Code requires not only subjective good faith but also that the effort to comply
with Article 6 be "commercially reasonable." See also Revised U.C.C. § 6-107 (3)(a). This requirement of both good faith, or honesty in fact, and commercial reasonableness is in effect an adoption of
the objective Article 2 definition of good faith for merchants. See U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1989).
216. Cf. Alces, supra note 11, at 852-59 (discusses fraudulent disposition paradigms applicable
in leveraged business acquisition setting).
217. 60 Bankr. 808 (W.O . Mo. 1985).
218. See II U.S.C. § 547 (1988). Though preferences are generally a matter of federal law,
some preferential transfers are avoidable under state law as fraudulent dispositions. See UFCA § 3
(fair consideration requires transfer of fair equivalent in good faith). The good faith element has
significance independent of the fair equivalence requirement. Thus, preferential exchanges made for
a fair equivalent still may be challenged for Jack of good faith. Good faith has been found lacking in
the case of preferential transfers to insiders. See, e.g., Tacoma Ass'n of Credit Men v. Lester, 72
Wash. 2d 453, 433 P.2d 901 (1967) (transfer from corporation to president fraudulent conveyance
irrespective whether for fair equivalence). While the good faith element of fair consideration was
deleted in the UFfA, § 5(b) was included to address specifically the problem of preferential transfers
to insiders. Kennedy, supra note 43, at 204-05.
219. II U.S.C. § 547. Section 547(b) states the elements of a preference: (I) a transfer of the
debtor's property interest; (2) "to or for the benefit of a creditor;" (3) "on account of an antecedent
debt;" (4) "while the debtor was insolvent;" (5) within ninety days of the bankruptcy petition (or
one year if the transferee-creditor was an insider); (6) which allows the creditor to receive more then
he would in a liquidation of debtor's assets. See generally P. ALCES, supra note 11, at Ch. 6; 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1J 547 (15th ed. 1990).
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transfers are deemed preferential. The trustee may recover only those preferential transfers effected within ninety days of the bankruptcy petition. In the case
of preferential transfers to an "insider,"220 transfers made within the year prior
to bankruptcy may be voidable.
In Kidder Skis, the court considered the trustee's preference attack against
a transferee who acquired the property allegedly preferentially transferred
ninety-one days before the debtor filed its voluntary bankruptcy petition.221 A
hint of collusion was in the air. 222 Given the ninety-day limitation and the fact
that the transferee was not an insider, the court was faced with the real possibility that the transfer would not be avoidable notwithstanding the fact that the
prejudicial impact of a preference was in evidence. Further, the bases of constructive fraudulent disposition avoidance under section 548 were not satisfied.
The court was left with only one remaining option: void the transfer as one
effected with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors of the
transferor-debtor. 223 The language of the court's opinion echoes that highlighted in Tabor Court Realty in terms that emphasize the potential coincidence
of the constructive and actual fraud actions:
There is no doubt that the transfer was with the intent to hinder, delay
or defraud the secured creditor....
Although Kidder may have given value for the transfer, the Court
agrees with the bankruptcy judge that it did not take the merchandise
in good faith. The bankruptcy judge noted that the debtor had a closer
financial relationship with Kidder than with other creditors. Also,
Kidder knew that the debtor was in financial trouble and unable to pay
for his inventory. 224
The Kidder Skis decision suggests that even the most subjective measure of
good faith may be construed in terms that would provide the basis of avoidance
under the Revision. More importantly, Kidder Skis confirms that the same facts
compromising a good faith finding can provide the predicate for an actual intent
to defraud action.
c. Objectification of Commercial Fraud Law
Cases such as Tabor Court Realty and Kidder Skis demonstrate the courts'
ability and willingness to find the elements of actual fraud in settings generally
construed as giving rise to only constructive fraud liability. There is no dearth
of authority recognizing that transactors are chargeable with knowledge of the
necessary consequences of their actions.225 In the bulk sales or fraudulent dis220. "Insider" is defined in the Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (1988).
221. Kidder Skis Int'l v. Williams, 60 Bankr. 808, 809 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
222. ld. at 809-10.
223. The symbiotic relationship between the preference and fraudulent disposition law has existed for some time. See Twyne's Case, 3 Coke Rep. BOb, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601)
(secret conveyance of goods to avoid debt action fraudulent). Although Twyne's Case is viewed as a
fraudulent conveyance case, it was in fact a preference action.
224. 60 Bankr. at 809-10.
225. See National Bank v. Yegen, 83 Mont. 265, 271 P. 612 (1928) (transferor deemed to have
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position contexts, it will be difficult for transferees to protest their good faith
when the reasonable inference may be drawn that the transferee was aware of
the consequences of the transfer. 226
Additional developments in the commercial fraud case law support the conclusion that an increasing number of transfers may be subject to avoidance using
actual fraud principles. One compelling recent decision, Levit v. Ingersoll Rand
Financial Corp., 227 considered a bankruptcy trustee's avoidance of a preferential
transfer made more than ninety days but less than one year prior to the initiation
of the bankruptcy proceeding. 228 For such transfers to be recoverable, the Code
requires that the transfer must have been made to or for the benefit of an insider
of the debtor. 229 In Levit, the debtor paid an obligation that had been guaranteed by an insider. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
found that, because the payment effected the release of the insider-guarantor, it
inured to the benefit of the insider and was recoverable from the non-insider
creditor by operation of Bankruptcy Code section 550(a). 230
In reaching his decision, Judge Easterbrook recognized that the focus of the
preference law, like the focus of constructive fraud law, is on the impact the
transfer had on the interests of the debtor and the creditors of the debtor. Most
telling, however, was the court's appreciation of the commercial dynamic surrounding the recovery of such preferential transfers. Given the special risks that
insider transactions present for outsider creditors, the preference law makes special provision to expand the period during which transfers to insiders may be
recovered as preferential. That expanded preference period constitutes a recognition that insiders are well postured to take advantage of the debtor and, derivatively, the creditors of the debtor. To thwart that type of fraudulent posturing,
intended inevitable consequences of her act in making conveyance). See also Prisbrey v. Noble, 505
F.2d 170, 174-75 (lOth Cir. 1974) (intent may be found in facts surrounding transaction); Life Science Church v. Personette (In re Life Science Church), 34 Bankr. 529, 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983)
(transferor actions support conclusion that transfer was fraudulent).
226. Cf. supra notes 98-112 and accompanying text for a discussion of concealment cases.
227. 874 F .2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
228. /d. at 1188.
229. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) provides:
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property (4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition,
if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider.
/d.
230. 874 F.2d at 1194-98. See also 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) which provides:
[T]o the extent that a transfer is avoided under section [547] of this title, the trustee may
recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the
value of such property, from (1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer
was made .. . .
/d.
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it is necessary to expose insider transactions to closer scrutiny.231 Commercial
fraud principles justify such scrutiny of insider preferences. Levit supports the
imposition of liability on non-insider creditors to vindicate those principles. Accordingly, the Levit decision provides analogous support for the thesis of this
essay: 232 because bulk transferees are or should be aware of the consequences of
their actions, it is not inappropriate for the fraudulent disposition law to provide
the means to avoid bulk sales that operate to the prejudice of the transferor's
creditors.
·
This objectification of commercial fraud law has been recognized by the
commentators. In a recent piece, Professor Steve Nickles reviewed seminal
lender liability cases and discerned "The Objectification of Debtor-Creditor Relations."233 He found that cases such as Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Lala, 234
K.MC. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 235 and State National Bank v. Farah Manufacturing Co. 236 represent "another instance of tort swallowing contract." 237 The
courts, according to Nickles, have replaced contractual standards with external
standards and thereby have found the means to upset transactions previously
subject only to scrutiny under contract law. He concluded that in each of the
three cases the debtor's dependency on the creditor gave rise to "higher duties
that transcend the contract between the parties. " 238 In that light, the concern of
the drafters of the Alternatives that the bulk sales law may "imped[e] normal
business practices" seems shallow. 239 The expectations developed by contract as
well as those developed by reference to normal business practices may be transcended by pervasive commercial fraud principles.
Another setting for this type of objectification is in the application of fraudulent disposition law to the foreclosure of collateral interests, such as Article 9
security interests. In an article defending the rule of Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 240 Professor Frank Kennedy recognized this objectifica231. Loans from insiders to their firms are not the only, or even the most important, concern of
outside creditors. Insiders frequently guarantee other loans. See Levit, 874 F.2d at 1195 (insiders
may induce firm to pay guaranteed loans preferentially; if the preference-recovery period for such
payments were identical to period for outside debts, this would be attractive device for insiders).
232. See Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490, 1494-95 (6th
Cir. 1990) (Levit court analysis followed).
233. Nickles, The Objectification of Debtor-Creditor Relations, 14 MINN. L. REv. 371 (1989).
234. 392 N.W.2d 179 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986) (in debtor-creditor relationship, deal between parties lacking confidential relation still subject to review for substantive fairness).
235. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (though state law only required subjective good faith on part
of bank, court allowed application of objective standard which imposed duty on bank to lend beyond
amount contracted for).
236. 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (management clause precluding former CEO's return to control of corporation and fixing bank's and corporation's own contractual standard of conduct, displaced by external standard of conduct tort of interference with prospective economic
advantage).
237. Nickles, supra note 233, at 374.
238. Id. at 381.
239. Revised U.C.C. Art. 6, Prefatory Note.
240. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). At issue in Durrett was whether the sale of real property in
a foreclosure sale was voidable under§ 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Code (now§ 548). The fair market
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tion. 241 He noted that the objectification of fraudulent disposition law began
with the cases construing the Statute of 13 Elizabeth: "While every statute derived from the Statute of 13 Elizabeth reaches transfers made 'with intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,' legislative codification of the law of fraudulent transfers has generally added provisions particularizing circumstances that
warrant avoidance of certain transfers without regard to the parties' intent. " 242
The Durrett decision, according to Kennedy, was the necessary result of that
process of objectification. Indeed, Kennedy's thesis in that article is that Durrett
does not change fraudulent transfer law. Rather, it represents the application of
established fraudulent disposition principles in the foreclosure context. 243
If the current commercial law climate has accommodated the development
and successful prosecution of fraudulent disposition actions premised on objective criteria, then adjustments of the bulk sales regime, a body of objective, constructive, fraud law, should be understood in terms of that climate. Fraudulent
disposition law has matured to the point where it may be construed to afford a
means for creditors to avoid a bulk sale on fraudulent disposition bases. In fact,
there are reasons that the fraudulent disposition law would be more attractive
than current Article 6 to creditors of the transferor and trustees in bankruptcy.
Consequently, the abrogation or limitation of bulk sales law may not yield the
result intended by the drafters of the new law.
2. Consequences of Repeal/Revision
Under the current bulk sales formulation, a noncomplying transfer is "ineffective"244 and a trustee in bankruptcy of the transferor may recover the property transferred in bulk, to the full extent contemplated by operation of the
Moore v. Bay rule. 245 The design of Alternative A, the repealer, is to preempt
the bulk sales avoidance theory altogether. The revision, Alternative B, substantially curtails the bases of avoidance. Moreover, it formulates the right of certain creditors to recover only in personam damages against the bulk transferee.
The avoidance option under current Article 6, an in rem remedy, is wholly abrogated by section 6-107(8) of the Revision. 2 46
value of the property was $200,000, but it was sold for only $115,400. /d. at 203. The Durrett court
held that a foreclosure sale constituted a transfer under§ 67(d). /d. at 204. The court further held
that the consideration paid was not a "fair equivalent" for the property transferred and that, therefore, the transfer was voidable as a constructive fraud. /d. at 203. See also Kennedy, Involuntary
Fraudulent Transfers, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 531, 532 (1987) (foreclosure sale in Du"ett worked
constructive fraud on unsecured creditors of mortgagor; Durrett court correct in finding foreclosure
sale is transfer under bankruptcy law).
241. Kennedy, supra note 240, at 575-77.
242. /d. at 537-38 & n.26 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(2)(B)(ii), 548(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985);
Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 877 (repealed 1978); U.C.C. § 6-104(1) (1986); UFTA §§ 4,5,
7A U.L.A. 643, 652-53, 657 (1985); UFCA §§ 4, 5, 8, 7A U.L.A. 474, 504, 576 (1985)).
243. Kennedy, supra note 240, at 576.
244. u.c.c. § 6-105.
245. See supra notes 164-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of Moore v. Bay.
246. See supra notes 191-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of Revised U.C.C. § 6107.
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Further, under the Revision, a complaining creditor would be able to recover in personam damages only if the bulk buyer had not acted in good
faith. 247 If the buyer is not able to establish its good faith, 248 the plaintiff-creditor may recover an amount equal to twice the net contract price for the purchase
of the assets transferred in bulk. 249 Thus, from the perspective of the complaining creditor, there is a substantial showing prerequisite to the recovery of
damages and no possibility to avoid the transfer completely. A plaintiff's recovery is further reduced by any portion of the contract price that has been "paid to
or applied for the benefit of the seller or a creditor" of the bulk seller. That
savings provision applies despite any bad faith on the part of the bulk buyer.
These results contrast in several ways from those provided under the unifonn state or federal bankruptcy law. First, the recovery under fraudulent disposition law is in rem, not in personam. A trustee in bankruptcy could avoid the
transfer and, via Moore v. Bay, recover all of the property transferred in bulk,
unlimited by the extent of any existing creditor's claim.
Second, under the revision, the class of potential plaintiffs could increase
dramatically. If the good faith of the bulk buyer-transferee is not established
under Revised Article 6, then arguably the buyer acted in bad faith. The difference between bad faith and intent is difficult to discern. Thus, in cases where
there would be any bulk sales cause of action under the revision, the plaintiff
might also be able to establish the actual intent to defraud contemplated by
every incarnation of the fraudulent disposition law. 2 so Under the actual intent
to defraud provisions, the scope of potential plaintiffs is expansive. Not only
may those creditors who held claims against the debtor at the time of the disposition initiate an action to set aside the transfer, those creditors whose claims
arise some time after the disposition will also have standing to complain. 2 s 1
Third, the savings clauses of the fraudulent disposition enactments differ
from the savings clause of Revised section 6-107(4)(a). 2 s2 In the proposed bulk
sales law the buyer who has not acted in good faith may still limit the recovery
of the plaintiff-creditor to the extent of any payments "paid to or applied for the
247. See Revised U.C.C. § 6-107(3)(b) (1989). The section provides that "[a] buyer who ...
held a good faith and commercially reasonable belief that this Article does not apply to the particular sale is not liable to creditors for failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6-104." Thus,
if a buyer acts in good faith, the creditor may not recover from the buyer.
248. See id. § 6-107(2) (buyer has burden of establishing good faith effort or belief).
249. /d. § 6-107(4).
250. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1988); UFTA § 4(a)(1); UFCA § 7; 13 Eliz., ch. 5, §I (1570).
251. The future creditor's standing arises from the actions of the debtor that indicate an intent
to avoid liability through the conveyance. Cf. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 28, § 340, at 588-90 (factors
indicating intent to avoid tort claimants include validity of cause against debtor, amount of possible
liability, debtor's expectation of litigation). See Hemphill Co. v. Davis Knitting Co., 114 Pa. Super.
94, 96, 173 A. 704, 706 (1934) (plaintiff-future creditor would be able to avoid conveyance by showing it was made with view toward incu"rring liability or to provide against contingencies of hazardous
business which gave rise to debts).
252. Compare UFCA § 9 and 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) with Revised U.C.C. § 6-107(4)(a). See supra
note 56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the UFCA and Bankruptcy Code savings provisions; supra note 201 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Revised Article 6 savings clause.
See also infra Appendix for text of Revised U.C.C. § 6-107(4)(a).
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benefit of the seller or a creditor." There is no requirement that the bad faith
payment inure in any way to the benefit of the party prejudiced by the bulk sale,
the plaintiff-creditor. It is enough that the seller received the payment. Under
the fraudulent disposition law, however, for the transferee to take advantage of
the savings clause, the transferee must establish that she acted in good faith in
making the payment to the debtor. It is difficult to see why a complaining creditor (including the trustee successor of that creditor) would pursue the bulk sales
action with its relatively limited recovery under Revised Article 6, rather than
construe the buyer's bad faith as tantamount to fraudulent intent to proceed
under the state or federal fraudulent disposition law.
Finally, Revised Article 6 includes a relatively short statute of limitations.
Revised section 6-110 provides a one year limitations period, which runs from
the time of the bulk sale, or, in the case of concealment, one year from the time
the sale is discovered or should have been discovered. The section also provides
that the buyer's mere failure to comply with Article 6 does not constitute concealment sufficient to toll the limitations period. The relevant limitations period
under the state fraudulent disposition law may be longer than one year in some
cases.253 Indeed, it is the existence of those longer limitations periods that
guides the bankruptcy trustee's decision to proceed via section 544(b) under the
state fraudulent disposition law rather than under Bankruptcy Code section 548
which provides a one year limitations period. 254
CONCLUSION

This article has tried to convince the reader that, while the sky may not yet
be falling, the abrogation or substantial revision of bulk sales law could occasion
cracks in the ceiling. It may be unrealistic to assume that creditors who would
have a cause of action under existing Article 6 would demurely relent once Article 6 is repealed or revised, without first considering the application of developing commercial fraud principles. The article has described the symbiotic
relationship between constructive and actual fraud and has characterized current Article 6 in terms that may inform application. of the law under the proposed Alternatives.
The object is not to apprise plaintiffs' counsel of theories they may not have
considered yet; instead, the object is to urge careful consideration of bulk sales
principles in the commercial fraud law pedagogy. Only if the commercial community understands bulk sales law and fraudulent disposition law in the terms
described here, may informed investigation of the black hole left by the Alternatives proceed.
253. See, e.g. , UFfA §§ 9(a), (b) (actions to avoid constructively fraudulent conveyances must
be brought within four years of transaction; actions against actual fraudulent conveyances must be
brought within later of four years or within one year of when transfer reasonably could have been
discovered). Maine, for example, has extended this period even further by replacing the four year
period provided for in the unifonn version with a period of six years. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 3580 (Supp. 1990).
254. 4 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note 219, ~ 544.03, at 544-16 (trustee's powers of
avoidance under§ 544(b) not circumscribed by time period or other restrictions found in § 548).
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APPENDIX
ARTICLE 6 · BULK TRANSFERS
SECTION

6-101.
6-102.
6-103.
6-104.
6-105.
6-106.
6-107.
6-108.
6-109.
6-110.
6-111.

Short Title.
"Bulk Transfers,; Transfers of Equipment; Enterprises Subject to This
Article; Bulk Transfers Subject to This Article.
Transfers Excepted From This Article.
Schedule of Property, List of Creditors.
Notice to Creditors.
Application of the Proceeds.
The Notice.
Auction Sales; "Auctioneer".
What Creditors Protected; [Credit for Payment to Particular
Creditors].
Subsequent Transfers.
Limitation of Actions and Levies.

§ 6-101. Short Title
This Article shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial
Code-Bulk Transfers.
§ 6-102. "Bulk Transfers"; Transfers of Equipment; Enterprises Subject to
This Article; Bulk Transfers Subject to This Article
( 1) A "bulk transfer, is any transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course
of the transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory (Section 9-1 09) of an enterprise subject to this Article.
(2) A transfer of a substantial part of the equipment (Section 9-109) of such
an enterprise is a bulk transfer if it is made in connection with a bulk transfer of
inventory, but not otherwise.
(3) The enterprises subject to this Article are all those whose principal
business is the sale of merchandise from stock, including those who manufacture
what they sell.
(4) Except as limited by the following section all bulk transfers of goods
located within this state are subject to this Article.
§ 6-103. Transfers Excepted From This Article
The following transfers are not subject to this Article:
(1) Those made to give security for the performance of an obligation;
(2) General assignments for the benefit of all the creditors of the transferor,
and subsequent transfers by the assignee thereunder;
(3) Transfers in settlement or realization of a lien or other security
interests;
(4) Sales by executors, administrators, receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, or
any public officer under judicial process;
(5) Sales made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings for
the dissolution or reorganization of a corporation and of which notice is sent to
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the creditors of the corporation pursuant to order of the court or administrative
agency;
(6) Transfers to a person maintaining a known place of business in this
State who becomes bound to pay the debts of the transferor in full and gives
public notice of that fact, and who is solvent after becoming so bound;
(7) A transfer to a new business enterprise organized to take over and con·
tinue the business, if public notice of the transaction is given and the new enter·
prise assumes the debts of the transferor and he receives nothing from the
transaction except an interest in the new enterprise junior to the claims of
creditors;
(8) Transfers of property which is exempt from execution.
Public notice under subsection (6) or subsection (7) may be given by publishing once a week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation where the transferor had its principal place of business in this state an
advertisement including the names and addresses of the transferor and transferee and the effective date of the transfer.
As amended in 1962.

§ 6-104. Schedule of Property, List of Creditors
( 1) Except as provided with respect to auction sales (Section 6-1 08), a bulk
transfer subject to this Article is ineffective against any creditor of the transferor
unless:
·
(a) The transferee requires the transferor to furnish a list of his existing
creditors prepared as stated in this section; and
(b) The parties prepare a schedule of the property transferred sufficient
to identify it; and
(c) The transferee preserves the list and schedule for six months next
following the transfer and permits inspection of either or both and
copying therefrom at all reasonable hours by any creditor of the
transferor, or files the list and schedule in (a public office to be here
identified).
(2) The list of creditors must be signed and sworn to or affirmed by the
transferor or his agent. It must contain the names and business addresses of all
creditors of the transferor, with the amounts when known, and also the names of
all persons who are known to the transferor to assert claims against him even
though such claims are disputed. If the transferor is the obligor of an outstanding issue of bonds, debentures or the like as to which there is an indenture
trustee, the list of creditors need include only the name and address of the indenture trustee and the aggregate outstanding principal amount of the issue.
(3) Responsibility for the completeness and accuracy of the list of creditors
rests on the transferor, and the transfer is not rendered ineffective by errors or
omissions therein unless the transferee is shown to have had knowledge.
As amended in 1962.

§ 6-105. Notice to Creditors
In addition to the requirements of the preceding section, any bulk transfer
subject to this Article except one made by auction sale (Section 6-1 08) is ineffec-
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tive against any creditor of the transferor unless at least ten days before he takes
possession of the goods or pays for them, whichever happens first, the transferee
gives notice of the transfer in the manner and to the persons hereafter provided
(Section 6-107).
[§ 6-106. Application of the Proceeds]
In addition to the requirements of the two preceding sections:
(1) Upon every bulk transfer subject to this Article for which new consideration becomes payable except those niade by sale at auction it is the duty of the
transferee to assure that such consideration is applied so far as necessary to pay
those debts ofthe transferor which are either shown on the list furnished by the
transferor (Section 6-104) or filed in writing in the place stated in the notice
(Section 6-1 07) within thirty days after the mailing of such notice. This duty of
the transferee runs to all the holders of such debts, and may be enforced by any
of them for the benefit of all.
(2) If any of said debts are in dispute the necessary sum may be withheld
from distribution until the dispute is settled or adjudicated.
(3) If the consideration payable is not enough to pay all of the said debts in
full distribution shall be made pro rata.]
Note: This section is bracketed to indicate division of opinion as to whether
or not it is a wise provision, and to suggest that this is a point on which State
enactments may differ without serious damage to the principle of uniformity.
In any State where this section is omitted, the following parts ofsections.
also bracketed in the text, should also be omitted, namely:
Section 6-107(2) (e).
6-108(3) (c).
6-109(2).
In any State where this section is enacted. these other provisions should
be also.

Optional Subsection (4)
[(4) The transferee may within ten days after he takes possession of the
goods pay the consideration into the (specify court) in the county where the
transferor had its principal place of business in this state and thereafter may
discharge his duty under this section by giving notice by registered or certified
mail to all the persons to whom the duty runs that the consideration has been
paid into that court and that they should file their claims there. On motion of
any interested party, the court may order the distribution of the consideration to
the persons entitled to it.]
Note: Optional subsection (4) is recommended for those states which do not
have a general statute providing for payment of money into court.

As amended in 1962.

§ 6-107. The Notice
( 1) The notice to creditors (Section 6-105) shall state:
(a) that a bulk transfer is about to be made; and
(b) the names and business addresses of the transferor and transferee,
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and all other business names and addresses used by the transferor
within three years last past so far as known to the transferee; and
(c) whether or not all the debts of the transferor are to be paid in full as
they fall due as a result of the transaction, and if so, the address to
which creditors should send their bills.
(2) If the debts of the transferor are not to be paid in full as they fall due or
if the transferee is in doubt on that point then the notice shall state further:
(a) the location and general description of the property to be transferred and the estimated total of the transferor's debts;
(b) the address where the schedule of property and list of creditors
(Section 6-104) may be inspected;
(c) whether the transfer is to pay existing debts and if so the amount of
such debts and to whom owing;
(d) whether the transfer is for new consideration and if so the amount
of such consideration and the time and place of payment; [and]
[(e) if for new consideration the time and place where creditors of the
transferor are to file their claims.]
(3) The notice in any case shall be delivered personally or sent by registered
or certified mail to all the persons shown on the list of creditors furnished by the
transferor (Section 6-104) and to all other persons who are known to the transferee to hold or assert claims against the transferor.
Note: The words in brackets are optional. See Note under § 6-106.
As amended in 1962.
§ 6-108. Auction Sales; "Auctioneer"
(1) A bulk transfer is subject to this Article even though it is by sale at
auction, but only in the manner and with the results stated in this section.
(2) The transferor shall furnish a list of his creditors and assist in the preparation of a schedule of the property to be sold, both prepared as before stated
(Section 6-104).
(3) The person or persons other than the transferor who direct, control or
are ·responsible for the auction are collectively called the "auctioneer". The auctioneer shall:
(a) receive and retain the list of creditors and prepare and retain the
schedule of property for the period stated in this Article (Section 6104);
(b) give notice of the auction personally or by registered or certified
mail at least ten days before it occurs to all persons shown on the
list of creditors and to all other persons who are known to him to
hold or assert claims against the transferor; [and]
((c) assure that the net proceeds of the auction are applied as provided
in this Article (Section 6-106).]
(4) Failure of the auctioneer to perform any of these duties does not affect
the validity of the sale or the title of the purchasers, but if the auctioneer knows
that the auction constitutes a bulk transfer such failure renders the auctioneer
liable to the creditors of the transferor as a class for the sums owing to them
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from the transferor up to but not exceeding the net proceeds of the auction. If
the auctioneer consists of several persons their liability is joint and several.
Note: The words in brackets are optional See Note under § 6-106.
As amended in 1962.
§ 6-109. What Creditors Protected; [Credit for Payment to Particular
Creditors]
( 1) The creditors of the transferor mentioned in this Article are those holding claims based on transactions or events occurring before the bulk transfer, but
creditors who become such after notice to creditors is given (Sections 6-105 and
6-1 07) are not entitled to notice.
[(2) Against the aggregate obligation imposed by the provisions of this Article concerning the application of the proceeds (Section 6-106 and subsection
(3)(c) of 6-108) the transferee or auctioneer is entitled to credit for sums paid to
particular creditors of the transferor, not exceeding the sums believed in good
faith at the time of the payment to be properly payable to such creditors.)
Note:

The words in brackets are optional. See Note under§ 6-106.

§ 6-110. Subsequent Transfers
When the title of a transferee to property is subject to a defect by reason of
his non-compliance with the requirements of this Article, then:
(1) a purchaser of any of such property from such transferee who pays no
value or who takes with notice of such non-compliance takes subject to such
defect, but
(2) a purchaser for value in good faith and without such notice takes free
of such defect.

§ 6-111. Limitation of Actions and Levies
No action under this Article shall be brought nor levy made more than six
months after the date on which the transferee took possession of the goods unless the transfer has been concealed. If the transfer has been concealed, actions
may be brought or levies made within six months after its discovery.
Note to Article 6: Section 6-106 is bracketed to indicate division ofopinion as to
whether or not it is a wise provision, and to suggest that this is a point on which
State enactments may differ without serious damage to the principle of
uniformity.
In any State where Section 6-106 is not enacted, the following parts of sections, also bracketed in the text, should also be omitted, namely:
Sec. 6-107(2) (e).
6-108(3) (c).
6-109(2).
In any State where Section 6-106 is enacted, these other provisions should be
also.
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U.C.C. SECTION 6-107

Revised § 6-107 provides, in pertinent part:

§ 6-107. Liability for Noncompliance.
(1) Except as provided in subsection (3), and subject to the limitation in
subsection (4):
(a) a buyer who fails to comply with the requirements of Section 6104(1)(e) with respect to a creditor is liable to the creditor for damages in the amount of the claim, reduced by any amount that the
creditor would not have realized if the buyer had complied; and
(b) a buyer who fails to comply with the requirements of any other
subsection of Section 6-104 with respect to a claimant is liable to
the claimant for damages in the amount of the claim, reduced by
any amount that the claimant would not have realized if the buyer
had complied.
(2) In an action under subsection (1), the creditor has the burden of establishing the validity and amount of the claim, and the buyer has the burden of
establishing the amount that the creditor would not have realized if the buyer
had complied.
(3) A buyer who:
(a) made a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of Section
6-104(1) or to exclude the sale from the application of this Article
under Section 6-103(3); or
(b) on the date of the bulk-sale agreement held a good faith belief that
this Article does not apply to the particular sale
is not liable to creditors for failure to comply with the requirements of Section 6104. The buyer has the burden of establishing the good faith effort or belief.
(4) In a single bulk sale the cumulative liability of the buyer for failure to
comply with the requirements of Section 6-104(1) may not exceed an amount
equal to:
(a) if the assets consist only of inventory and equipment, twice the net
contract price, less the amount of any part of the net contract price
paid to or applied for the benefit of the seller or a creditor; or
(b) if the assets include property other than inventory and equipment,
twice the net value of the inventory and equipment less the amount
of the portion of any part of the net contract price paid to or applied for the benefit of the seller or a creditor which is allocable to
the inventory and equipment.
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